The Descent of Responsible Procreation: A Genealogy of an Ideology by Nice, Julie A.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-2012
The Descent of Responsible Procreation: A
Genealogy of an Ideology
Julie A. Nice
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Julie A. Nice, The Descent of Responsible Procreation: A Genealogy of an Ideology, 45 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 781 (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol45/iss3/4
  
 
781 
THE DESCENT OF  
RESPONSIBLE PROCREATION:  
A GENEALOGY OF AN IDEOLOGY 
Julie A. Nice* 
        Just as societal practices related to marriage and procreation have 
changed remarkably during the past several decades, the amount of 
litigation regarding same-sex marriage has increased substantially. 
Over time, defenders of state bans on same-sex marriage have primarily 
leaned on the responsible-procreation defense, which surmises that 
same-sex couples already procreate responsibly and that the rights and 
responsibilities of marriage should be limited to furthering the goal of 
encouraging more responsible procreation by heterosexuals. 
        This Article traces the genealogy of responsible procreation. 
Rooted in religion, the defense was once rejected as a justification for 
limiting heterosexuals’ constitutional rights. Later, it appeared as a 
justification of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. Soon, courts split 
on its constitutionality: the high court of Massachusetts found it to be 
“unpersuasive” while other state appellate courts used it as a 
justification for their rejections of challenges to same-sex-marriage 
bans. Finally, with the first federal trial and subsequent Ninth Circuit 
decision on the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, the 
responsible-procreation defense succumbed to the overwhelming weight 
of evidence against its logic. 
        As a result, the emerging trend is that both executive officials and 
courts are rejecting the defense and concluding that same-sex-marriage 
bans are drawn not to further proper legislative ends but to make same-
sex couples and their children unequal to everyone else. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article traces the genealogy of responsible procreation, 
which has emerged as the primary defense of the same-sex-marriage 
ban. To put it succinctly, the responsible-procreation defense 
surmises that same-sex couples already procreate responsibly and 
that the rights and responsibilities of marriage should be limited to 
furthering the goal of encouraging more responsible procreation by 
heterosexuals.
1
 This Article seeks to illuminate the responsible-
procreation defense by tracing how it emerged and how it has 
functioned and fared in constitutional challenges.
2
 
What does this genealogy of responsible procreation reveal? 
Here is a brief preview of what is to come. The roots of responsible 
procreation are undoubtedly religious,
3
 and its presuppositions are in 
considerable tension with current social and legal realities.
4
 Most 
saliently, responsible procreation has been rejected as a justification 
for limiting heterosexuals’ constitutional rights.
5
 Its starring role was 
in welfare reform’s racialized and gendered rhetoric demonizing 
poor, single, black mothers.
6
 On welfare reform’s heels, Congress 
hastily harnessed responsible procreation for use in the Defense of 
Marriage Act,
7
 racing against the much-feared first state recognition 
of same-sex marriage.
8
 When first subjected to trial at the state level, 
the responsible-procreation defense lacked credible supporting 
evidence.
9
 But leading social-conservative academics and advocates 
came to its rescue.
10
 The newly elaborated defense was rejected 
 
 1.  See Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in 
Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 781–87 (2001). 
 2.  Although I limit my historical reach to relatively recent contemporary time, my aim is 
“to defamiliarize taken-for-granted beliefs in order to render them susceptible to critique and to 
illuminate present-day conflicts[,]” in the great tradition of Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A 
Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS: J. WOMEN 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 309, 310–11 (1994). 
 3.  See infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text. 
 4.  See infra notes 85–105 and accompanying text. 
 5.  See infra notes 103–27 and accompanying text. 
 6.  See infra notes 134–40 and accompanying text. 
 7.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, pt. 5, at 12–18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 
2910–14. 
 8.  See infra notes 130–54 and accompanying text. 
 9.  See infra notes 155–71 and accompanying text. 
 10.  See infra note 176 and accompanying text. 
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nonetheless as “unpersuasive” in a sleeper test case as well as in the 
notorious decision invalidating the same-sex-marriage ban in 
Massachusetts.
11
 Eventually, however, several state intermediate and 
high courts endorsed it.
12
 But other state high courts have rejected 
the defense, and some state governments and now the federal 
government have disavowed it.
13
 It has failed to withstand the rigor 
of its first federal trial, succumbing to the overwhelming weight of 
evidence against its logic.
14
 In addition, most courts since the first 
federal trial have rejected the defense in recent challenges to various 
anti-gay measures.
15
 In short, the responsible-procreation defense 
appears to be ideological, invidious, and on the wane. 
This genealogy was provoked by two particularly riveting 
moments that occurred during the litigation of California’s 
Proposition 8 (“Prop 8”), revealing the crux of the constitutional 
controversy over banning same-sex marriage. First came the “I don’t 
know” moment. During a pretrial hearing, the federal district court 
judge asked counsel representing the Prop 8 proponents how 
recognizing same-sex marriage impaired the state’s interest in 
regulating procreation via marriage.
16
 The Prop 8 proponents’ 
counsel responded, “Your honor, my answer is: I don’t know. I don’t 
know.”
17
 Not surprisingly, media reports highlighted what seemed 
like a critical admission.
18
 The Prop 8 proponents argued on appeal, 
however, that their counsel’s meaning was clarified by his full 
 
 11.  See infra notes 174–82 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See infra notes 190–202 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See infra note 203–205 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See infra notes 228–234. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the trial court made roughly 
eighty factual findings supported by over 330 subparts citing to specific evidence in the record, 
and the court further incorporated seventy-five citations to evidence in its legal analysis. 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 
2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). The court noted that it relied primarily on the evidence 
cited but also on “uncited cumulative documentary evidence in the record.” Id. 
 15.  See discussion infra Parts XI, XII. 
 16.  Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 931. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Judge Won’t Toss Prop. 8 Challenge; Same-Sex Marriage, S.F. 
CHRON., Oct. 15, 2009, at A1; Adam Liptak, In Battle on Marriage, the Timing May Be Key, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009, at A14; Judge Refuses to Dismiss Gay Marriage Ban Suit, 
MSNBC.COM (Oct. 14, 2009, 9:31:14 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33319490/ns/us_ 
news-crime_and_courts. 
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statement that “it depends on things we can’t know” because the 
impact of same-sex marriage “can’t possibly be known now.”
19
 
Second came the “you don’t have to have evidence” moment. 
During closing argument, the Prop 8 proponents’ counsel 
emphasized, “[R]esponsible procreation is really at the heart of 
society’s interest in regulating marriage.”
20
 When the trial court 
interjected and asked counsel to identify the evidence from the trial 
that supported this contention, counsel replied, “[Y]ou don’t have to 
have evidence of this point.”
21
 Again, the proponents argued on 
appeal that their counsel’s full response clarified his meaning: “You 
don’t have to have evidence of this point if one court after another 
has recognized [it].”
22
 
These moments revealed the constitutional dispute’s core 
question: whether the government needs, and whether it has, any 
evidence to support the now-residual justification that banning same-
sex marriage is rationally related to the purported governmental 
interest of ensuring responsible procreation. The Prop 8 proponents 
maintain that the constitutionality of banning same-sex marriage 
could not be determined based on evidence at a trial.
23
 This position 
was itself a turnabout for those defending the same-sex-marriage 
ban. During the litigation in Iowa, for example, the state insisted the 
constitutional challenge to the ban raised “factual disputes” and 
claimed the denial of a trial there had hindered the state’s ability to 
present evidence to demonstrate that banning same-sex marriage 
was, in fact, rationally related to “preserving procreative marriage.”
24
 
 
 19.  Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 41 n.17, Perry, 2012 WL 372713 
(Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577), 2010 WL 3762119, at *41 n.17 [hereinafter Proponents’ Appellate 
Brief] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20.  Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 931 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22.  Proponents’ Appellate Brief, supra note 19, at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23.  See id. at 41 n.17 (arguing that the implications of same-sex marriage cannot yet be 
determined at a trial). 
 24.  See Final Amended Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 19, Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (No. 07-1499), 2008 WL 5156763, at *19 (arguing that the state’s 
witnesses “should have been considered as their reasoning is something that the legislature could 
believe as being part of the purpose in preserving procreative marriage which is a rational basis 
for the law” and that “factual disputes” should have barred summary judgment for the plaintiffs). 
It is interesting to note that the two witnesses Iowa’s brief claimed the state had intended to call 
as marriage experts, id., were the same two witnesses who were deposed during the California 
litigation, namely Katherine Young and Paul Nathanson from McGill University in Canada. 
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 944. When the Prop 8 proponents withdrew Young and Nathanson as 
witnesses, the plaintiffs entered their deposition testimony into evidence because their testimony 
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So what about the evidence? Two trials have served as 
bookends, thus far, for the current wave of litigation that is 
challenging the governmental justifications for banning same-sex 
marriage. During the first trial in Hawaii in 1996, the state promised 
to present evidence demonstrating how banning same-sex marriage 
was necessary to ensure responsible procreation, but the state 
effectively abandoned any effort to support this argument at trial.
25
 
Most recently in California in 2010, the state defendants declined to 
defend Prop 8 in any manner, and thus the state remained officially 
silent as to its interests.
26
 But state officials expressly disavowed the 
responsible-procreation defense during prior litigation in state court 
on the grounds that the defense hardly comports with official state 
policy.
27
 In lieu of the state asserting its official interests, the ballot 
proponents defending Prop 8 have relied on responsible procreation 
as their primary defense.
28
 They have not, however, supported the 
argument with much evidence. Indeed, the federal district court 
characterized their strategy as “eschewing all but a rather limited 
factual presentation.”
29
 
That the question has come down to the responsible-procreation 
defense is rather remarkable for two reasons relevant here, one 
jurisprudential and one ideological. Certainly, defenders of the same-
sex-marriage ban have marshaled the full panoply of jurisprudential 
 
included critical admissions that supported the plaintiffs’ evidence. Id. For example, according to 
the trial court’s description of their testimony, 
Young testified at her deposition that homosexuality is a normal variant of human 
sexuality and that same-sex couples possess the same desire for love and commitment 
as opposite-sex couples. Young also explained that several cultures around the world 
and across centuries have had variations of marital relationships for same-sex 
couples. . . . Nathanson testified at his deposition that religion lies at the heart of the 
hostility and violence directed at gays and lesbians and that there is no evidence that 
children raised by same-sex couples fare worse than children raised by opposite-sex 
couples. 
Id. at 944–45 (citation omitted). 
 25.  See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 26.  Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928. The attorney general conceded that Prop 8 is 
unconstitutional. Id. 
 27.  In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 723 n.33 (Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 183 P.3d 
384 (Cal. 2008), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 28.  Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 931 (“During closing arguments, proponents again focused on 
the contention that responsible procreation is really at the heart of society’s interest in regulating 
marriage.” (citation omitted)). 
 29.  Id. The trial court emphasized that the proponents had an “ample opportunity” to 
support their arguments in a “full trial” in which they were represented by “able and energetic 
counsel.” Id. at 1001–02. 
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arguments, with the responsible-procreation defense buried among 
formal, historical, doctrinal, moral, structural, positive rights, and 
slippery-slope arguments. The responsible-procreation defense 
essentially makes a functional argument, asserting that marriage’s 
function is to encourage responsible procreation and optimal 
parenting.
30
 It seems especially surprising that such a functional 
argument would emerge as the nearly exclusive focal point for the 
same-sex-marriage-ban defense precisely because legal policy at the 
state and federal levels generally does not prevent same-sex couples 
from procreating and parenting, studies show no difference in the 
well-being of their children, and their children have the same need 
for stability as marital children have.
31
 
Why then has the responsible-procreation defense emerged as 
the primary defense? Perhaps it remains because the other doctrinal 
arguments simply fail to withstand contemporary constitutional 
jurisprudence. The formal argument—asserting that the same-sex-
marriage ban merely follows the definition of marriage to include 
only opposite-sex couples—fails on its own circularity, just as any 
definitional exclusion begs the question of its justification. The 
historical argument—asserting that the ban preserves the tradition of 
including only opposite-sex couples
32
—fails because tradition alone 
does not suffice to justify denials of liberty and equality. The 
doctrinal argument—asserting that the ban is constitutional because 
the Supreme Court has not recognized same-sex marriage as a 
fundamental right or same-sex couples and their children as a suspect 
class so as to warrant heightened scrutiny
33
—fails because the Court 
has yet to reach these questions and also because both Romer v. 
Evans
34
 and Lawrence v. Texas
35
 demonstrate that discrimination 
against gays sometimes fails even rationality review. The moral 
argument—asserting that the societal majority disapproves of 
 
 30.  Id. at 932 (“[T]he state has an interest in encouraging sexual activity between people of 
the opposite sex to occur in stable marriages because such sexual activity may lead to pregnancy 
and children, and the state has an interest in encouraging parents to raise children in stable 
households.”). 
 31.  See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 32.  Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 930 (“Denial of marriage to same-sex couples preserves [the 
tradition of opposite-sex] marriage.”). 
 33.  Proponents’ Appellate Brief, supra note 19, at 70. 
 34.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 35.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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homosexuality as unnatural and/or immoral
36
—fails because moral 
disapproval alone is not a sufficient justification for denials of 
equality or liberty. The structural argument—asserting that 
separation-of-powers principles would leave the question to the 
legislature and federalism principles would leave it to the states
37
—
fails because the judiciary must enforce constitutional protections of 
liberty and equality against both the legislature and the states. The 
positive-right argument—asserting that marriage is a positive rather 
than a negative right and thus is effectively protected from 
constitutional challenge
38
—fails because the Court has not treated 
marriage as such a positive right in its other marriage decisions. 
Finally, the typical last resort slippery-slope argument—asserting 
that allowing same-sex marriage will lead to a parade of horribles 
such as polygamy or incest or the like
39
—fails because the law draws 
lines every day, and the duty of the judiciary is precisely to examine 
the constitutionality of these lines as challenges arise. 
It is surprising, nonetheless, that the responsible-procreation 
defense would be the last defense standing, given that it has so little 
“footing in the realities” of the context,
40
 a fact that the courts must 
consider.
41
 Whether at the level of heightened scrutiny or rationality 
review, any justification for an unequal denial of liberty must be 
based on a means-to-end relationship that is actually or factually 
rational considering the relevant evidence (rather than merely 
 
 36.  Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (“[A] primary purpose of Proposition 8 was to ensure that 
California confer a policy preference for opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples based on a 
belief that same-sex pairings are immoral and should not be encouraged in California.”). 
 37.  Proponents’ Appellate Brief, supra note 19, at 102–03 (“[O]ur Constitution establishes a 
federal system that permits a diversity of approaches to difficult and uncertain state issues.”). 
 38.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”); see also Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 957 (making an analogy with racial restrictions on 
marriage that “[d]efenders of race restrictions argued the laws were ‘naturally-based and God’s 
plan just being put into positive law’”). 
 39.  FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE SLIPPERY-SLOPE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2004), 
available at http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF04C51.pdf. 
 40.  Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *22 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 
2012) (citing Heller v. Doe ex rel Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)). 
 41.  See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 370–73, 376, 378 (1967) (considering 
“immediate objective,” “ultimate effect,” and “historical context and the conditions existing prior 
to its enactment,” while also “sifting facts and weighing circumstances” to determine whether a 
voter initiative that amended the California Constitution to prohibit anti-discrimination housing 
laws “constitutionalized” discrimination in violation of equal protection). 
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conceivable because relevant evidence is ignored).
42
 Yet after two 
full trials, defenders of the same-sex-marriage ban have not 
demonstrated that it rationally furthers responsible procreation. So 
why do they continue to press this defense? 
The remaining explanation for the endurance of the responsible-
procreation defense is ideological. In short, perhaps the defense itself 
best reflects the ideology of the movement against same-sex 
marriage, which has made exhaustive efforts to deny same-sex 
couples and their children the rights and responsibilities of 
marriage.
43
 This movement has proven its dedication to restoring and 
imposing traditional family values through law,
44
 and perhaps the 
responsible-procreation defense best matches these traditional family 
values. What is surprising on the ideological level is that the 
responsible-procreation defense actually contradicts a well-
established ideological belief that forms the underlying basis of the 
opposition to gay rights. Those mobilized around opposition to gay 
rights routinely have charged gay and lesbian individuals with 
engaging in sexually promiscuous and irresponsible behavior. For 
example, the Family Research Council has declared: “[T]he vast 
majority of homosexual relationships are short-lived and transitory,” 
“homosexual couples typically engage in a shocking degree of 
promiscuity,” and therefore they “are unsuitable role models for 
children because of their lifestyle.”
45
 In defending same-sex-
marriage bans, however, such organizations are contradicting these 
historic stereotypes of gays and lesbians, arguing in effect that same-
sex couples have behaved so responsibly in planning and investing in 
their families that they do not need the support of marriage.
46
 These 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Constitutional Law & Civil Procedure Professors 
Erwin Chemerinsky, et al., in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees Urging Affirmance at 15–19, Perry, 
(Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577), 2010 WL 4622572, at *15–19. 
 43.  See EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY 
PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO MARRY 194–97 (2004) (explaining that preventing gay couples from 
marrying denies them and their children certain tangible and intangible benefits); see, e.g., 
Richard Kim, Why Proposition 8 Won in California, CBS NEWS (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.cbs 
news.com/stories/2008/11/07/opinion/main4581859.shtml (explaining that the Christian Right 
used a “staggering disinformation campaign” to organize support for California’s ban on gay 
marriage). 
 44.  See, e.g., Kim, supra note 43. 
 45.  FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 39, at 3–4. In this example, the FRC cites one 
study on HIV infections in Amsterdam as support for its conclusion. Id. at 4 n.8. 
 46.  One appellate brief went so far as to assert that a state “could rationally decide that, for 
the welfare of children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability, in 
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organizations now assert in litigation that different-sex couples are 
the ones whose sexual promiscuity and parental irresponsibility 
endanger societal interests, and therefore marriage must be reserved 
as an incentive available only for different-sex couples to encourage 
more responsible heterosexual behavior.
47
 
Lower courts that have endorsed the responsible-procreation 
justification also appear to be relying on this new nonpromiscuous 
and ultraresponsible stereotype of same-sex parents as the basis for 
arguing that same-sex couples do not need marriage.
48
 For example, 
one state intermediate appellate court reasoned that parents 
who have invested the significant time, effort, and expense 
associated with assisted reproduction or adoption may be 
seen as very likely to be able to provide such an 
environment, with or without the “protections” of marriage, 
because of the high level of financial and emotional 
 
opposite-sex than in same-sex relationships” and “that unstable relationships between people of 
the opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born into or grow up in unstable 
homes than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that promoting stability in opposite-sex 
relationships will help children more.” Brief Amici Curiae of James Q. Wilson et al., Legal & 
Family Scholars in Support of Defendant-Appellees at 5, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (No. 17716), 2007 WL 4725446, at *5 [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae of 
James Q. Wilson et al.] (quoting Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006)). 
 47.  See id. The federal trial court in Perry described the logic of the Prop 8 proponents’ 
argument as follows: 
[T]he state has an interest in encouraging sexual activity between people of the 
opposite sex to occur in stable marriages because such sexual activity may lead to 
pregnancy and children, and the state has an interest in encouraging parents to raise 
children in stable households. The state therefore, the argument goes, has an interest in 
encouraging all opposite-sex sexual activity, whether responsible or irresponsible, 
procreative or otherwise, to occur within a stable marriage, as this encourages the 
development of a social norm that opposite-sex sexual activity should occur within 
marriage. Entrenchment of this norm increases the probability that procreation will 
occur within a marital union. Because same-sex couples’ sexual activity does not lead 
to procreation, according to proponents the state has no interest in encouraging their 
sexual activity to occur within a stable marriage. Thus, according to proponents, the 
state’s only interest is in opposite-sex sexual activity. 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citations omitted), aff’d sub 
nom. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). 
 48.  See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7. It is perhaps ironic that the assumption of 
ultraresponsible procreative behavior on the part of same-sex couples seems to make more sense 
if both same-sex partners are recognized as legal parents with duties to support the child, which 
the anti-gay-rights movement opposes. At the very least, it seems doubtful that a similar accolade 
of responsibility would be bestowed upon sperm donors with prolific offspring. See, e.g., 
Jacqueline Mroz, From One Sperm Donor, 150 Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2011, at D1 
(discussing how, in the United States, not only are sperm donors anonymous but there are no 
limitations on the number of sperm a male can donate). 
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commitment exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or 
children in the first place.
49
 
This court specifically described such parents as “heavily invested”
50
 
and simply dismissed in footnotes the fact that some same-sex 
couples have children without any extraordinary financial 
investment, such as from prior opposite-sex relationships or from 
unassisted artificial insemination.
51
 This court nonetheless 
commended these purportedly responsible same-sex parents while 
criticizing irresponsible opposite-sex parents who procreate by 
“natural” reproduction “with no foresight or planning” and “without 
any thought for the future,” because “‘accidents’ do happen” and 
“unintended children” may arrive “unexpectedly.”
52
 This court 
concluded the state “may legitimately create” opposite-sex marriage 
“to discourage unplanned, out-of-wedlock births resulting from 
‘casual’ intercourse” and to encourage parents to stay together to 
raise their children.
53
 Because same-sex couples “are not at ‘risk’ of 
having random and unexpected children,” this court held that the 
state could distinguish based on “the ability to procreate 
‘naturally.’”
54
 Neither this court nor any of the others that have 
endorsed the responsible-procreation defense has grappled 
meaningfully with the fact that dissolution, disability, and death 
happen to same-sex couples and that their children sometimes suffer 
the loss of a parent’s support. 
The cognitive dissonance is apparent: the anti-gay-rights 
movement often has promulgated an ideological belief about the 
promiscuity of gays and lesbians
55
 to justify denying rights. But they 
now contradict this belief in an effort to justify denying marriage 
rights to same-sex couples, basically sacrificing their goal of 
 
 49.  Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 24 nn.9–10. 
 52.  Id. at 24–25 (emphasis omitted). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 30–31. 
 55.  I limit my analysis to gay and lesbian rights, rather than bisexual and/or transgender 
rights, because that has been the focus of the campaign against same-sex marriage. For a superb 
analysis of how the containment of bisexuality pervades this controversy, see Michael Boucai, 
Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
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perpetuating the ideological belief about same-sex promiscuity in 
favor of their overarching goal of denying gay rights.
56
 
To be sure, although the responsible-procreation argument 
contradicts the stereotype of the promiscuous gay, it nonetheless 
serves to reinforce the stereotype of the affluent gay by assuming 
that same-sex parents have sufficient resources to invest in their 
families. Justice Antonin Scalia notoriously invoked the affluent-gay 
stereotype in his dissent in Romer.
57
 To support his argument that 
gays have disproportionate political power, Justice Scalia explained: 
“[T]hose who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in 
disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high 
disposable income, and, of course, care about homosexual-rights 
issues much more ardently than the public at large . . . .”
58
 But 
Justice Scalia’s generalized assumption of affluence belies the 
evidence. As recent Census Bureau data reveal, same-sex couple 
families are “significantly more likely to be poor than are 
heterosexual married couple families.”
59
 Even more striking is the 
finding that children in households headed by same-sex couples 
suffer “poverty rates twice those of children in heterosexual married 
couple households.”
60
 In short, the children deemed nonmarital due 
to the same-sex-marriage ban have no less need of parental 
responsibility than marital children have. 
Surely the fervor behind the opposition to same-sex marriage 
reflects the various ideological commitments of the anti-gay-rights 
movement. The question is what role the responsible-procreation 
defense plays in perpetuating this ideology. In other words, what is 
the meaning of judicial endorsement of the responsible-procreation 
defense? This question is of enormous importance. A rich scholarly 
literature continues to demonstrate and explore the productive role of 
government in shaping not only law and policy but also social status 
 
 56.  For a richly detailed contextual analysis about “how these debates over same-sex 
marriage are all about rights, and ironically all about their limits,” see JONATHAN GOLDBERG-
HILLER, THE LIMITS TO UNION: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 37 
(2002). 
 57.  517 U.S. 620, 636–52 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 58.  Id. at 645–46 (citations omitted). 
 59.  RANDY ALBELDA ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., POVERTY IN THE LESBIAN, GAY, AND 
BISEXUAL COMMUNITY at i (2009), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Albelda-Badgett-Schneebaum-Gates-LGB-Poverty-Report-March-2009.pdf. 
 60.  Id. 
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and even identity, including sexuality.
61
 To illuminate the role of the 
responsible-procreation defense, this Article starts at the beginning 
of the contemporary same-sex marriage controversy and traces its 
genealogy. 
II.  THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS  
OF RESPONSIBLE PROCREATION 
During the first wave of litigation challenging state refusals to 
allow same-sex couples to marry in the early 1970s, courts rejected 
challenges to the denial of same-sex marriage based in part on 
assumptions that same-sex couples do not procreate to form families 
and that marriage is the natural channel for procreation. As the state 
of Washington’s intermediate appellate court succinctly explained in 
Singer v. Hara,
62
 “[t]he fact remains that marriage exists as a 
protected legal institution primarily because of societal values 
associated with the propagation of the human race. Further, it is 
apparent that no same-sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of 
children by their union.”
63
 
In addition to the original appeal to nature in attempting to 
establish a link between marriage and procreation, this purported link 
was also tied to a particular religious heritage.
64
 For example, in 
Baker v. Nelson,
65
 the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, “The 
institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely 
involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is 
as old as the book of Genesis.”
66
 Of course, this biblical source also 
 
 61.  Perhaps the most formidable recent example of such scholarship is the multiple-award-
winning book MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009). Canaday melds sexuality studies with social policy, 
political theory, and legal theory to examine the contexts of the military, immigration, and 
welfare regulation. See id. She meticulously demonstrates how the construction of status/identity 
and the state were simultaneous and mutually reinforcing, ultimately producing “a state that not 
only structures but is itself structured by sexuality.” Id. at 258. For an excellent overview of the 
types of scholarly literature exploring the various roles of state actors, see John D. Skrentny, Law 
and the American State, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 213 (2006). 
 62.  522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 63.  Id. at 1195. The state intermediate appellate court also concluded that marriage “is based 
upon the state’s recognition that our society as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and 
desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of children.” Id. 
 64.  Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage: 
Two Are Better Than One, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8–31 (2001) (providing an examination of the 
religious roots of the opposition to same-sex marriage). 
 65.  191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
 66.  Id. at 186. 
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provided abundant material contradicting the notion that procreation 
is inherently tied to monogamous marriage.
67
 
As the nascent movement for gay rights struggled for legal 
traction during the 1970s and 1980s, the assumptions that same-sex 
couples do not procreate
68
 and that religious morality condemns 
homosexuality were quite common.
69
 Perhaps the most famous 
articulation of each assumption emerged from the Supreme Court in 
its 1986 decision upholding the criminalization of sodomy in Bowers 
v. Hardwick.
70
 Justice White’s reasoning for the majority directly 
made the point: “No connection between family, marriage, or 
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has 
been demonstrated . . . .”
71
 It was left to Chief Justice Burger to cite 
religious heritage in his concurrence, asserting that condemnation of 
homosexuality “is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and 
ethical standards”
72
 and invoking Blackstone’s notorious description 
of sodomy as “an offense of ‘deeper malignity’ than rape.”
73
 
The following year, the Vatican released its own articulation of 
“responsible procreation” in response to scientific advances in 
biomedical-reproductive technology.
74
 Penned by then-Cardinal 
Joseph Ratzinger, the Vatican’s Instruction on Respect for Human 
Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation sought to 
establish procreative guidelines based on Catholic morality 
 
 67.  E.g., Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and 
the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 20 (2009) (“Sarah’s 
handmaiden Hagar, who gave birth to Abraham’s children because of Sarah’s infertility, would be 
quite surprised to discover that marriage was the institution designed to police Abraham’s sexual 
impulses; and the sisters Rachel and Leah, both married to Jacob, knew that marriage facilitated, 
rather than constricted, Jacob’s access to multiple sexual partners.”). 
 68.  Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1375, 1396–97 (2010). 
 69.  See Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 
165, 167–68 (1998). 
 70.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 71.  Id. at 191. 
 72.  Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 73.  Id. at 197. 
 74.  JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER & ALBERTO BOVONE, CONGREGATION FOR THE 
DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON 
THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION: REPLIES TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF THE DAY (1987), available 
at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_ 
19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html. 
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principles.
75
 In explaining why human procreation must take place in 
marriage, the Instruction was clear: “from the moral point of view a 
truly responsible procreation vis-à-vis the unborn child must be the 
fruit of marriage.”
76
 An examination of the text of the Vatican’s 
explanation for this Instruction reveals how strikingly similar it is to 
the responsible-procreation argument that has emerged in 
constitutional litigation, as this key excerpt reveals: 
For human procreation has specific characteristics by virtue 
of the personal dignity of the parents and of the children: 
the procreation of a new person, whereby the man and the 
woman collaborate with the power of the Creator, must be 
the fruit and the sign of the mutual self-giving of the 
spouses, of their love and of their fidelity. The fidelity of 
the spouses in the unity of marriage involves reciprocal 
respect of their right to become a father and a mother only 
through each other. The child has the right to be conceived, 
carried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up 
within marriage: it is through the secure and recognized 
relationship to his own parents that the child can discover 
his own identity and achieve his own proper human 
development. The parents find in their child a confirmation 
and completion of their reciprocal self-giving: the child is 
the living image of their love, the permanent sign of their 
conjugal union, the living and indissoluble concrete 
expression of their paternity and maternity[.] By reason of 
the vocation and social responsibilities of the person, the 
good of the children and of the parents contributes to the 
good of civil society; the vitality and stability of society 
require that children come into the world within a family 
and that the family be firmly based on marriage. The 
tradition of the Church and anthropological reflection 
recognize in marriage and in its indissoluble unity the only 
setting worthy of truly responsible procreation.
77
 
 
 75.  Id.; see also Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women’s Rights: The New 
Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction, 14 MED. L. REV. 73, 79 (2006) (examining the influence 
of Catholic doctrine on Italian law restricting assisted reproduction). 
 76.  RATZINGER & BOVONE, supra note 74, at pt. II.A.1. 
 77.  Id. (endnotes omitted). 
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As the Instruction explained, the Vatican linked responsible 
procreation to both child development and societal stability. The 
Vatican’s language presaged the current litigation argument in terms 
resembling constitutional jurisprudence, emphasizing that marriage 
is the necessary means to securing the “right” of married spouses to 
be parents only with one another, securing the “right” of children to 
be brought up within marriage for purposes of “proper human 
development,” and securing the “truly responsible procreation” 
presumably required for society’s “vitality and stability.”
78
 Of 
course, the Instruction’s logic explicitly depended on marriage being 
an “indissoluble unity,” which obviously no longer reflects current 
societal and legal realities.
79
 
Like the Vatican, same-sex-marriage opponents have expressed 
similar concern about the demise of the permanence of marriage and 
have used the corollary limit of marriage’s effectiveness as a means 
to their ends.
80
 Opponents’ litigation arguments also reflect their 
religious and societal laments.
81
 Whether or not marriage is a 
necessary or effective means for family and societal stability, those 
who agree with the Vatican’s moral guidelines seek to guard the 
marriage ideal by characterizing it as the necessary gateway to 
family and societal stability.
82
 
Both the Vatican and other opponents of same-sex marriage 
have treated marriage as the sole means to the end of achieving 
security for all involved—spouses, children, and society.
83
 In this 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 
98 tbl.133 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0133.pdf 
(finding 1.182 million divorces were filed in the United States between 1990 and 2009, compared 
with 2.443 million marriages). 
 80.  See Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. as Amici Curiae In Support of 
Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants and Supporting Reversal at 7, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2012 
WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577), 2010 WL 4075739, at *7. 
 81.  See, e.g., id. at 7–17. 
 82.  See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Family Research Council, In Support of the 
Intervening Defendant-Appellants at 2, Perry, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (Nos. 10-
16696, 11-16577) (“It is precisely because the opposite-sex nature of marriage is the essence of 
marriage as it has been understood in our history, that the district court’s fundamental rights 
analysis must be rejected.”). During the Hawaii trial of the constitutionality of the state’s same-
sex-marriage ban, one of the state’s expert witnesses testified that marriage is a “gateway to 
becoming a parent,” although he conceded that gays and lesbians “can create stable family 
environments and raise healthy and well-adjusted children.” Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 
WL 694235, at *6–7 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), aff'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). 
 83.  RATZINGER & BOVONE, supra note 74, at pt. II.A.1. 
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regard, they have framed a particular question for constitutional 
resolution: if the underlying goal is securing parents, children, and 
society, then the question becomes whether—and, if so, to what 
extent—denying marriage for same-sex couples advances the 
security of parents, children, and society. Addressing this question 
requires knowledge of societal actualities in order to assess the 
nature and degree of the fit between the means of banning same-sex 
marriage and the state’s interest in family security. It is precisely 
these societal realities that have undergone fundamental change.
84
 
III.  CHANGED SOCIETAL  
AND LEGAL REALITIES 
During the forty years since litigants brought the first same-sex-
marriage challenges in the early 1970s, societal practices related to 
both procreation and marriage have changed dramatically.
85
 For 
example, using contraception to prevent unwanted procreation has 
become the norm. According to recent data from the Guttmacher 
Institute, more than 99 percent of women aged fifteen to forty-four 
who had heterosexual intercourse used contraception.
86
 Nonetheless, 
nearly half of the pregnancies in the United States are unintended, 
and 40 percent of these are terminated by abortion.
87
 
Over the last three decades, the use of assisted reproductive 
technology to assist procreation also has grown rapidly. For example, 
among developed countries, 3 percent of live births have been 
conceived through in vitro fertilization.
88
 The worldwide estimate is 
that four million children have been conceived through in vitro 
fertilization.
89
 
In the United States, a recent report from the National Center for 
Health Statistics found a surge in heterosexual cohabitation, with the 
percentage of women who have cohabited with an opposite-sex 
 
 84.  Katharine B. Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 189, 189–90 
(2005). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE UNITED STATES (2010), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_contr_use.pdf. 
 87.  GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES (2010), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf. 
 88.  Nicholas Wade, In Vitro Fertilization Pioneer Wins Nobel Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
2010, at A1 (announcing the Nobel Prize to English biologist Dr. Robert G. Edward for his 
contribution to in vitro fertilization as an advance in human reproductive technology). 
 89.  Id. 
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sexual partner doubling between 1987 and 2002.
90
 This report’s 
estimates suggest that two-fifths of all children will spend some time 
in a cohabiting household prior to age sixteen.
91
 Social scientists and 
legal scholars have been studying the rise and effects of cohabitation 
for some time.
92
 The Census Bureau has redoubled its efforts to 
collect data about the actual incidence of cohabiting households, 
culminating in one recent report that found more than a quarter of 
unmarried mothers previously presumed to be single were living 
with an unmarried partner, whether of the same or opposite sex.
93
 
These developments are not limited to heterosexual couples, as 
confirmed by recent findings from a joint study of the Williams 
Institute and the Urban Institute showing that “[m]ore than one in 
three lesbians have given birth and one in six gay men have fathered 
or adopted a child.”
94
 
During this period of profound change in sexual and marital 
practices, the legal framework for regulation of the family has 
 
 90.  NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CDC, MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6 (2002) OF THE NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 4 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/ 
sr_23/sr23_028.pdf. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  For an insightful and comprehensive examination of the history, demography, social 
science literature, and legal treatment of heterosexual cohabitation, as well as law reform 
proposals, see CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(2010). For earlier law reform proposals regarding cohabitation, see Grace Ganz Blumberg, 
Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125 (1981); and 
Linda McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond Marriage?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
379 (2003). For a detailed analysis of why the law should not favor marriage, regardless of sexual 
orientation, see NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008). Professor Polikoff sensibly suggests three principles, rather 
than marriage, to guide the rights and responsibilities of family law: “(1) place the needs of 
children and their caretakers above the claims of able-bodied adult spouses/partners; (2) support 
the needs of children in all family constellations; and (3) recognize adult interdependency.” Id. at 
13738. Her functional focus on economic stability and emotional peace of mind matches the 
California Supreme Court’s understanding of how marriage has functioned: “[E]ntry into a 
formal, officially recognized family relationship provides an individual with the opportunity to 
become a part of one’s partner’s family, providing a wider and often critical network of economic 
and emotional security.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 424 (2008), superseded in part by 
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. For an argument that the family should be 
freed from control by the state, see Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 
119 YALE L.J. 1236 (2010). 
 93.  Tamar Lewin, Many Single Mothers Have a Live-in Partner, Census Bureau Finds, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, at A17 (describing the findings of a report entitled “Fertility of 
American Women: 2008”). 
 94.  GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2007), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/Gates-Badgett-Macomber-Chambers-Final-Adoption-Report-Mar-2007.pdf. 
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undergone enormous change as well. As Professor Edward Stein has 
succinctly summarized: legislatures and/or courts have protected 
contraception, allowed no-fault divorce, recognized cohabitation and 
non-marital relationships, allowed surrogacy, and recognized 
nonbiological parents.
95
 Another important change has been the 
development of a comprehensive federal system for establishing 
paternity and enforcing child support obligations regardless of 
marital status.
96
 Indeed, in a robust examination of every recorded 
judicial decision in gay and lesbian adoption and custody cases over 
fifty years, Professor Kimberly Richman found that the flexibility of 
family law gradually but inexorably has facilitated the inclusion of 
same-sex couples and their children.
97
 
In addition to changes in societal practice and legal regulation, 
major developments have occurred in constitutional jurisprudence. 
Most famously, the Supreme Court’s contraception trilogy initially 
relied on a zone of privacy encompassed within the liberty protected 
by due process to invalidate restrictions on access to contraception 
for married couples in Griswold v. Connecticut
98
 and subsequently 
extended contraceptive protection by applying equal protection to 
invalidate restrictions on access to contraception for unmarried 
individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird
99
 and then for minors in Carey v. 
Population Services International.
100
 The Supreme Court’s decision 
 
 95.  Edward Stein, The “Accidental Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal 
Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 412 (2009) (“[C]ourts have 
found that laws prohibiting contraception are unconstitutional; the divorce process has become 
much easier (especially because of the move from fault to no-fault divorce); courts have 
recognized cohabitation for some legal purposes; non-marital legal relationships have been 
created; courts have upheld surrogacy agreements; people who are not the ‘biological’ parents of 
their children are listed as the parents on the birth certificates; and, more generally, the notion of 
who counts as a parent has been expanded.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 96.  For an engaging analysis of how strengthening child-support enforcement has been a 
key focus of welfare reform, see BRENDA COSSMAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: THE LEGAL AND 
CULTURAL REGULATION OF SEX AND BELONGING 13042 (2007). 
 97.  KIMBERLY D. RICHMAN, COURTING CHANGE: QUEER PARENTS, JUDGES, AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (2009). 
 98.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 99.  405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 100.  In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court decided that a state could not prohibit access to 
contraception because such a regulation invaded the constitutional protection of a zone of privacy 
that includes marriage. 381 U.S. at 485. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court concluded: “If the right 
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 405 U.S. at 453. In Carey v. Population Services 
International, the Court explicitly applied strict scrutiny, explaining that “where a decision as 
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in Zablocki v. Redhail
101
 presupposed that procreation was not 
 
fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden 
on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express 
only those interests.” 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 15556 
(1976)). The Court then invalidated New York’s law criminalizing the sale or distribution of 
contraceptives to minors under age sixteen. Id. at 698. 
  Both Eisenstadt and Carey rejected the suggestion that the state could penalize 
irresponsible procreation. The majority in Eisenstadt reasoned that “[i]t would be plainly 
unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an 
unwanted child as punishment for fornication, which is a misdemeanor under [the state statute].” 
405 U.S. at 448. Similarly, the Court in Carey endorsed and quoted this statement from 
Eisenstadt, noting that other provisions in New York law contradicted the justification of 
deterring illegal sexual conduct among minors. 431 U.S. at 695 n.18 (citing New York statutes 
that allowed girls as young as fourteen to marry with parental and judicial permission as well as 
those that required distribution of contraception to certain welfare recipients, including children 
who could be considered sexually active). 
  Carey also provided clarification about the burden on the government to justify its 
regulation. The Court in Carey noted that there was no evidence that limiting access to 
contraceptives would discourage early sexual behavior and that the state’s burden to justify its 
interference with a fundamental right required “more than a bare assertion, based on a conceded 
complete absence of supporting evidence, that the burden is connected to such a policy.” Id. at 
696. Although this statement was made in the plurality section of Justice Brennan’s opinion (part 
I—joined by only four justices), Justice White’s concurrence agreed that the state had “not 
demonstrated that the prohibition against distribution of contraceptives to minors measurably 
contributes to the deterrent purposes which the State advances as justification for the restriction.” 
Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring). 
  Two final notes about the opinions in Carey are relevant here. First, the Court engaged in 
a side skirmish about potential challenges to laws restricting sexual relations between consenting 
adults, foreshadowing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). Justice Powell’s concurrence objected that the majority seemed to be extending 
strict scrutiny whenever the government burdens “personal decisions in matters of sex,” Carey, 
431 U.S. at 703 (Powell, J., concurring), which prompted Justice Brennan to reply—twice—that 
the majority was not deciding about statutes regulating private consensual sexual behavior among 
adults. Id. at 711 n.5; id. at 694 n.17 (majority opinion). Justice Rehnquist was paying attention as 
well. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist refused to refute the majority point-by-point 
because doing so would concede too much validity to their decision, but he could not let pass the 
majority’s assertion that the Court had not definitely answered whether and to what extent the 
Constitution prohibits regulation of private, consensual sexual behavior. Justice Rehnquist 
responded that the constitutional validity of such regulation had been “definitively established.” 
Id. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Second, Justice Stevens’ concurrence emphasized that 
there was no evidence, or any serious contention, that the state’s interest in inhibiting minors’ 
sexual conduct would be achieved significantly by limiting access to contraception, and therefore, 
he argued that the law was defended “as a form of propaganda rather than a regulation of 
behavior.” Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens explained,  
Although the State may properly perform a teaching function, it seems to me that an 
attempt to persuade by inflicting harm on the listener is an unacceptable means of 
conveying a message that is otherwise legitimate. The propaganda technique used in 
this case significantly increases the risk of unwanted pregnancy and venereal disease. It 
is as though a State decided to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding 
the use of safety helmets. One need not posit a constitutional right to ride a motorcycle 
to characterize such a restriction as irrational and perverse. 
Id. 
 101.  434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
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inherently linked to marriage. The Court in Zablocki specifically 
justified marriage protection as a fundamental right on the basis that 
marriage should receive “equivalent protection” as procreation 
receives.
102
 In short, the importance of marriage led to treating 
procreative decision-making as a fundamental right in Griswold, 
which could not be denied unequally in Eisenstadt and Carey, while 
the importance of procreative decisions led to treating marriage as a 
fundamental right in Zablocki. In other words, the Court has 
recognized that marriage and procreation are independent aspects of 
liberty and has relied on the constitutional protection of each to 
justify the constitutional protection of the other. 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
 OF IRRESPONSIBLE  
HETEROSEXUAL PROCREATION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Zablocki deserves special 
attention here because it squarely addressed the purported state 
justifications for denying marriage as a means to encouraging 
responsible heterosexual procreation, which is the issue now 
occupying center stage in the same-sex-marriage litigation.
103
 
Zablocki involved both equal protection and due process challenges 
to a Wisconsin statute that prohibited granting a marriage license to 
any resident who had failed to prove both that he had complied with 
any prior court-ordered child-support obligation and that his children 
were not public charges or likely to become public charges.
104
 
In that case, a state court had ordered high school student Roger 
Redhail to pay child support for a daughter born “out of wedlock.”
105
 
Redhail failed to make any support payments while unemployed over 
the following two years, and his child had received welfare benefits 
since birth.
106
 When Redhail then applied for a license to marry a 
woman with whom he was expecting another child, the county clerk 
denied his application pursuant to the statute.
107
 
 
 102.  Id. at 386. 
 103.  See id. at 388–91. 
 104.  Id. at 375. 
 105.  Id. at 37778. 
 106.  Id. at 378. 
 107.  Id. 
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In an 8–1 decision, the Court applied what looked like strict 
scrutiny (which it referred to as “critical examination”)
108
 and 
invalidated the Wisconsin statute under the Equal Protection Clause 
because it violated Redhail’s fundamental right to marry.
109
 Writing 
for five justices,
110
 Justice Marshall first emphasized that the Court 
in Loving v. Virginia
111
 had invalidated Virginia’s ban on interracial 
marriage based on independent equal protection and due process 
grounds.
112
 His opinion extolled the fundamental importance of the 
right to marry through an eloquent litany of quotations from a series 
of equal protection and due process decisions relating to family 
autonomy.
113
 While the majority conceded that the state’s ends were 
“legitimate” and even “substantial,” they concluded that the statute’s 
means “unnecessarily impinge[d] on the right to marry.”
114
 
The state argued that its interest in counseling non-custodial 
parents to pay child support justified the statute.
115
 The majority 
found no provision in the statute for such counseling and no evidence 
in the record that such counseling occurred, and it rejected the 
sufficiency of this justification for denying marriage after any such 
 
 108.  Id. at 383. The Court reasoned that a classification that significantly interferes with a 
fundamental right must be invalidated “unless it is supported by sufficiently important state 
interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.” Id. at 388. 
 109.  Id. at 382, 387–88. 
 110.  Id. at 375. In addition to the five-justice majority, Justices Stewart and Powell concurred 
in the judgment but declined to join Justice Marshall’s opinion. Id. at 391–96 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); id. at 396–403 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stewart rejected the majority’s equal 
protection basis but nonetheless agreed that the statute violated due process. Id. at 391–96 
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Powell objected to declaring marriage to be a “fundamental 
right” and to using “critical examination” or “compelling state interest” analysis, but he agreed 
that the statute did “not pass muster under either due process or equal protection standards” 
because the state failed to justify its “unprecedented foreclosure of marriage to many of its 
citizens solely because of their indigency.” Id. at 396–97, 400, 403 (Powell, J., concurring). 
Justice Powell also noted that requiring a compelling government interest would cast doubt on 
other state marriage restrictions, such as “bans on incest, bigamy, and homosexuality.” Id. at 399. 
 111.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 112.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12). 
 113.  Id. at 383–85 (discussing Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 486 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942); Maynard 
v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); and other cases). 
 114.  Id. at 388. Although Justice Marshall did not consider whether the state’s interests were 
“compelling,” Justice Powell lamented that the majority had applied a compelling-interest test, 
which would cast doubt on other restrictions governing marriage. Id. at 396, 399 (Powell, J., 
concurring). In a similar criticism, Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion disagreed with Justice 
Powell’s use of an “intermediate” standard of review, although Justice Powell did not label his 
analysis as intermediate. Id. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 115.  Id. at 388 (majority opinion). 
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counseling had occurred.
116
 The state also argued that its interest in 
safeguarding the welfare of out-of-custody children justified the 
statute.
117
 The majority noted that the state’s argument was 
somewhat unclear regarding this connection, but it nonetheless 
examined whether the justification could be advanced through two 
corollary interests: first, providing an incentive for Redhail to make 
past-due child support payments, and second, preventing him from 
incurring new support obligations.
118
 
The Court rejected the first “collective device” justification 
because the statute merely denied marriage rather than actually 
collecting child support payments. In addition, the Court stated that 
the state already collected child support through more direct and 
effective measures, such as wage assignments, civil contempt 
proceedings, and criminal penalties.
119
 The Court also rejected the 
second justification of preventing new support obligations as both 
“grossly underinclusive,” because the statute did not prevent Redhail 
from incurring new financial commitments by having additional 
children, and “substantially overinclusive” because the statute 
prohibited Redhail from potentially improving his financial situation 
by adding income from a new spouse.
120
 The Court also noted that, if 
the state wished to require parents to be responsible for ensuring that 
their children do not become public charges, the state could address 
this directly by adjusting the criteria for determining child support 
amounts.
121
 
The majority’s reasoning in Zablocki thus recognized the reality 
that Redhail might procreate, incur child support obligations, and not 
be able to pay, regardless of whether he is allowed to marry.
122
 
Therefore, the Zablocki Court held that conditioning a marriage 
license on financial support of children interferes “directly and 
substantially” with the right to marry and that denying marriage 
“cannot be justified” by the state’s interests related to responsible 
procreation.
123
 This constitutional holding severed marriage from 
 
 116.  Id. at 388–89. 
 117.  Id. at 389. 
 118.  Id. at 389–90. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 390. 
 122.  Id. at 389–90. 
 123.  Id. at 387, 391. 
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procreation. Applying Zablocki to the same-sex-marriage ban, it 
stands to reason that if a state cannot deny marriage to those who 
actually have procreated irresponsibly, it would be anomalous to 
allow a state to deny marriage to those who presumably have not 
procreated irresponsibly. 
Lurking behind the responsible-procreation defense is a concern 
about the cost of the governmental safety net.
124
 This was not lost on 
then-Justice Rehnquist, who began his dissent in Zablocki by arguing 
that the Court should have applied the most deferential form of 
rational basis famously established by Dandridge v. Williams.
125
 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Zablocki cited the section of 
Dandridge in which the Court reasoned that states have leeway to 
make an “imperfect,” “rough,” “illogical,” and “unscientific”
126
 
classification in the area of economics and social welfare so long as 
“any state of facts may reasonably be conceived to justify it.”
127
 
Justice Rehnquist argued that, regardless of whether the Court 
applied the rational basis test under equal protection or the rational 
relation test of due process, both standards viewed the statute in light 
of “the traditional presumption of validity” and, so viewed, the 
statute was “a permissible exercise of the State’s power to regulate 
family life and to assure the support of minor children.”
128
 But 
Justice Rehnquist filed these objections in a lone dissent. 
Thus, as things stood at the end of the 1980s, same-sex couples 
apparently could be denied the right to marry because they 
presumably could not procreate irresponsibly, but heterosexuals 
could not be denied the right to marry even if they did procreate 
irresponsibly. In 1990, several same-sex couples in Hawaii brought 
the game-changing lawsuit challenging this discrimination, which 
 
 124.  Id. at 408–09 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 125.  Id. at 407 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485–87 (1970) (upholding 
Maryland’s limitation of welfare benefits to a maximum grant amount per family and rejecting 
the equal protection claim that the family cap discriminated against larger families as compared to 
smaller families)). 
 126.  Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 
U.S. 61, 69–70 (1913)). 
 127.  Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)). 
 128.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also rejected the 
reasoning of the concurring justices, who had agreed to invalidate the statute on the basis that it 
would deny marriage to the truly indigent, because Justice Rehnquist claimed there had been no 
showing that Redhail was truly indigent in fact. Id. at 408–09. 
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would provoke a national backlash and provide the first opportunity 
for an evidentiary vetting of the responsible-procreation defense.
129
 
V.  THE HAWAIIAN GAUNTLET  
AND CONGRESSIONAL FERVOR 
In December 1990, Hawaiian officials denied three same-sex 
couples’ applications for marriage licenses.
130
 Represented by local 
civil rights lawyer Dan Foley, these couples challenged the denial as 
violating the state’s constitution, launching the current wave of 
litigation seeking recognition of same-sex marriage.
131
 In 1993, the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that the denial of marriage to same-
sex couples was a sex-based classification that would be 
unconstitutional unless the state could show that its denial furthered a 
compelling state interest and was narrowly drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights.
132
 Rather than 
ruling based on generalized assumptions, Hawaii’s high court 
remanded the case for trial.
133
 
While the Hawaii litigation was pending, much attention at the 
federal level was focused on President Bill Clinton’s struggle to 
enact bipartisan legislation to fulfill his campaign promise to “end 
welfare as we know it.”
134
 The key phrase of welfare reform was the 
promotion of “personal responsibility.”
135
 Congress and President 
Clinton battled over competing versions of welfare reform,
136
 
eventually reaching a compromise in the summer of 1996. In the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act,
137
 Congress sought to end dependence of impoverished families 
on welfare benefits by promoting work and marriage, preventing and 
reducing the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and 
 
 129.  Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *6–7 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996), aff’d, 
950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  GOLDBERG-HILLER, supra note 56, at 2. 
 132.  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Douglas J. Besharov, End Welfare Lite as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at 
A19. 
 135.  See, e.g., Linda McClain, Irresponsible Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 339 
(1996); Janet Simmonds, Coercion in California: Eugenics Reconstituted in Welfare Reform, 17 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 269, 277 (2009). 
 136.  McClain, supra note 135, at 341 & n.6, 342. 
 137.  See Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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encouraging the formation of two-parent families.
138
 This landmark 
legislation drastically altered the structure of welfare by removing 
the federal floor (e.g., eliminating the federal entitlement for eligible 
individuals and giving states block grants with discretion to establish 
their own conditions on eligibility) and imposing a federal ceiling 
(e.g., imposing new federal time limits on receipt of benefits, 
strengthening the federal requirements for workfare and child 
support enforcement, and prohibiting benefits to many 
immigrants).
139
 Throughout the welfare reform debates, racialized 
and gendered stereotypes of the “welfare queen” and “deadbeat dad” 
dominated the discourse.
140
 
While they were busy battling over welfare reform, conservative 
members of Congress were watching the events in Hawaii with 
considerable alarm. Republican leaders of the House of 
Representatives proposed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 
direct response to the events in Hawaii.
141
 In its report accompanying 
the proposed DOMA (the “House Report”), the House Judiciary 
Committee lambasted two sets of now-familiar villains: gay-rights 
lawyers and activist judges.
142
 The House Report acknowledged that 
leading gay-rights organizations had not been willing to make same-
sex marriage a priority prior to the independent challenge pursued by 
the three same-sex couples in Hawaii.
143
 But the House Report 
nonetheless underscored that it was “critical to understand” that 
DOMA had to be considered within the context of an “orchestrated 
 
 138.  JULIE A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBEK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON POVERTY LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 93–95, 617–28 (1997). 
 139.  Id.; see also Julie A. Nice, Forty Years of Welfare Policy Experimentation: No Acres, 
No Mule, No Politics, No Rights, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1 (2009) (critiquing the propriety of 
welfare policy experimentation in the context of poor people’s lack of political leverage or 
judicial protection); Julie Nice, Promoting Marriage Experimentation: A Class Act?, 24 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 31 (2007) (critiquing marriage promotion for welfare recipients as class-based 
experimentation when considered in light of recent social science evidence about marriage and 
poverty). 
 140.  See BRENDA COSSMAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: THE LEGAL AND CULTURAL REGULATION 
OF SEX AND BELONGING 119–42 (2007). 
 141.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, pt. 2, at 4–6 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 
2910–14. 
 142.  Id. at 3–4. 
 143.  Id. at 4, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2908 (acknowledging that neither the Lambda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund nor the American Civil Liberties Union Lesbian and Gay 
Rights Project had prioritized same-sex marriage). 
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legal assault being waged against traditional heterosexual marriage 
by gay rights groups and their lawyers.”
144
 
The House Report further described judges in Hawaii as 
“prepared to foist the newly-coined institution of homosexual 
‘marriage’ upon an unwilling Hawaiian public.”
145
 The House 
Report then assigned blame to both gay-rights lawyers and activist 
judges, further linking them by claiming that “the threat to traditional 
marriage laws in Hawaii and elsewhere has come about because two 
judges of one state Supreme Court have given credence to a legal 
theory being advanced by gay rights lawyers.”
146
 These assertions 
ignored the fact that a local civil-rights lawyer, not gay-rights 
organizations, initiated the Hawaii litigation on behalf of the three 
same-sex couples. 
The House Report proceeded to identify four governmental 
interests advanced by DOMA, including defending heterosexual 
marriage, defending traditional morality, protecting state sovereignty 
and democratic self-governance, and preserving scarce government 
resources.
147
 Within the section describing the governmental interest 
in defending heterosexual marriage, the House Report explicitly 
articulated the responsible-procreation rationale: 
At bottom, civil society has an interest in maintaining 
and protecting the institution of heterosexual marriage 
because it has a deep and abiding interest in encouraging 
responsible procreation and child-rearing. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Were it not for the possibility of begetting children 
inherent in heterosexual unions, society would have no 
particular interest in encouraging citizens to come together 
in a committed relationship.
148
 
 
 144.  Id. at 2–3, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2906–07. 
 145.  Id. at 6, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2910. 
 146.  Id. at 5, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2909. The House Report further 
explained: “Just as it appears that judges in Hawaii are prepared to foist the newly-coined 
institution of homosexual ‘marriage’ upon an unwilling Hawaiian public, the Hawaii lawsuit also 
presents the possibility that other States could, through the protracted and complex process of 
litigation, be forced to follow suit.” Id. at 6, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2910. 
 147.  Id. at 12, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2916. With the exception of defending 
heterosexual marriage, similar governmental arguments were rejected in Romer v. Evans. See 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996). 
 148.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 13–14, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2917–18. 
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During congressional hearings, various members of Congress argued 
that same-sex marriage would harm children, for example, by 
threatening the “moral fiber” of society and causing the family to 
“lose its very essence,” by “deliberately” creating “motherless or 
fatherless families,” by declaring homosexuality to be “desirable and 
good” when it is “not healthy and is actually destructive to 
individuals,” and by teaching children that “chastity is old 
fashioned.”
149
 Many other statements directly impugned 
homosexuality as “immoral,” “aberrant,” “depraved,” “unnatural,” 
and “harmful.”
150
 
These legislative statements are precisely the type of direct 
evidence of intent that the courts typically consider to determine 
whether an invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating 
factor.
151
 Nonetheless, just four months after DOMA was introduced, 
and only a few weeks after President Clinton signed the overhaul of 
welfare to mandate greater personal responsibility on the part of 
impoverished parents, Congress and President Clinton agreed to 
enact DOMA, with final congressional approval coming on the same 
day that the trial of Hawaii’s same-sex-marriage ban began.
152
 
Despite congressional fervor in support of the responsible-
procreation defense, the U.S. Department of Justice has now 
expressly and repeatedly disavowed any reliance on the responsible-
procreation defense in recent federal court litigation specifically 
because “the United States does not believe that DOMA is rationally 
related to any legitimate government interests in procreation and 
child-rearing and is therefore not relying upon any such interests to 
defend DOMA’s constitutionality.”
153
 Nonetheless, in between 
 
 149.  Charles J. Butler, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress’s Use of Narrative in 
the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 873–76 (1998) (recounting these 
and other statements from the congressional debates). 
 150.  Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex 
Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2701–02 (2004) (collecting statements from the 
congressional record). 
 151.  As the Supreme Court has explained: “Determining whether invidious discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
 152.  GOLDBERG-HILLER, supra note 56, at 4. 
 153.  Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant United States of America’s Motion to 
Dismiss at pt. 3, at 6–7, Smelt v. United States, No. SACV 09-00286 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009), 
2009 WL 2610458, at pt. 3, at *6–7 [hereinafter Reply to Motion to Dismiss, Smelt]; see also 
Mary L. Bonauto, DOMA Damages Same-Sex Families and Their Children, FAM. ADVOC., 
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DOMA’s reliance in 1996 and the Justice Department’s disavowal in 
2009, the responsible-procreation argument gained considerable 
traction as the primary justification in decisions upholding same-sex-
marriage bans.
154
 But the argument’s momentum would not have 
seemed likely when the defense went missing during its first test at 
trial. 
VI.  MISSING IN ACTION  
AT THE FIRST TRIAL 
When the Hawaii trial finally began in September 1996, the 
political controversy had been raging for more than five years since 
the lawsuit was filed, and more than three years had passed since the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii had remanded the case to the trial court to 
allow the state an opportunity to demonstrate that the ban was 
narrowly drawn to further compelling state interests.
155
 
Unquestionably, the possibility of same-sex marriage in Hawaii 
fundamentally altered the political and legal landscape with regard to 
same-sex marriage, with advocates on both sides of the controversy 
spending enormous sums of money.
156
 
For their defense of the same-sex-marriage ban, state officials 
initially proclaimed they would prove that the ban served the interest 
of “fostering procreation within a marital setting,” among other 
interests.
157
 Just before the trial commenced, the state apparently 
modified this strategy, shifting focus to the argument that the state 
 
Winter 2010, at 10, 16 (describing the Justice Department’s disavowal of purported interests in 
“responsible procreation and child-rearing” in its memorandum (citing Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19 n.10, Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 
699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-10309), 2009 WL 5803678, at *22 n.10 
[hereinafter Motion to Dismiss, Gill])). 
 154.  Reply to Motion to Dismiss, Smelt, supra note 153, at pt. 3, at 6–7. 
 155.  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). 
 156.  Over three million dollars were spent on the constitutional amendment designed to 
overrule the Baehr decision. GOLDBERG-HILLER, supra note 56, at 112, 251 n.83. For an 
examination of the economic impact of recognizing same-sex marriage, see Jennifer Gerarda 
Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 759, 810–15 (1995) (discussing the positive and negative economic 
consequences of Hawaii becoming the first state to legalize same-sex marriage). 
 157.  Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *3 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) 
(Finding of Fact 18). After a majority of state voters passed the constitutional amendment 
authorizing the state legislature to deny same-sex marriage, Same-Sex Marriage Timeline, 
PROCON.ORG, http://borngay.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000025#20th (last 
updated Feb. 22, 2012), the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed the trial court decision without 
opinion. Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (unpublished table decision). 
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has a compelling interest in promoting the optimal development of 
children, each of whom would be served best by being “raised in a 
single home by its parents, or at least by a married male and 
female.”
158
 The state effectively abandoned any effort to support the 
procreative defense of the ban. 
Proceeding instead with its optimal-child-development defense, 
the state presented four expert witnesses at trial.
159
 Two of the state’s 
experts conceded that same-sex couples are able to raise children 
who are healthy and well adjusted,
160
 and a third proffered no 
opinion on whether children raised by same-sex couples could be 
healthy and well adjusted.
161
 The remaining expert witness testified 
to various theoretical or methodological shortcomings within nine 
studies of same-sex parents and/or their children.
162
 The trial court 
noted, however, that this expert’s criticism of the relevant studies 
was undercut by his admission that he doubted the value of any 
social-science studies, even if conducted properly.
163
 In short, none 
of Hawaii’s experts offered credible support for the assertions that 
sexual orientation is an indicator of parental fitness and that children 
raised by same-sex couples are less healthy or less well adjusted. 
One of the state’s experts testified, to the contrary, that gay and 
lesbian parents are “doing a good job” and “the kids are turning out 
just fine.”
164
 
Against these key concessions by the state’s experts, the 
challengers to Hawaii’s denial of same-sex marriage presented 
testimony from four expert witnesses.
165
 These experts testified that 
sexual orientation is not an indicator of parental fitness and that 
same-sex couples are as fit and loving as married couples are and 
that their children are as healthy and well adjusted as children of 
 
 158.  Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *3 (Finding of Fact 19). 
 159.  Id. at *4 (Findings of Fact 20–21). 
 160.  Id. at *5, *7 (Findings of Fact 31, 51). 
 161.  Id. at *10 (Finding of Fact 70). 
 162.  Id. at *8 (Finding of Fact 59). 
 163.  Id. at *8–9 (Findings of Fact 58–60). 
 164.  Id. at *5, *18 (Findings of Fact 38, 135). For a recent synthesis of the robust evidence 
that the kids are indeed alright, see for example, Courtney G. Joslin, Searching for Harm: Same-
Sex Marriage and the Well-Being of Children, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81 (2011). 
 165.  The trial court found two of these experts, Pepper Schwartz and David Brodzinsky, to 
be “especially credible,” and commended them for presenting their testimony in a 
“knowledgeable, informative and straightforward manner” and basing their opinions “on their 
significant research and analysis, and their clinical and professional experience, respectively.” 
Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *10 (Finding of Fact 76). 
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married couples are.
166
 Each emphasized that it is the nurturing 
quality of the relationship between parent and child that is most 
important to the child’s optimal development.
167
 
Based on the paucity of support from the state’s experts and the 
persuasive testimony from the challenger’s experts, the trial court 
subsequently found that the state had “failed to establish or prove 
that the public interest in the well-being of children and families, or 
the optimal development of children will be adversely affected by 
same-sex marriage.”
168
 
Buried in the testimony and findings from this first trial was an 
important, albeit subtle, point emphasized by Pepper Schwartz. 
Professor Schwartz testified that society shores up marriage by 
bringing others into the marriage fold, offering rituals for entering 
their relationships, providing support along the way, but also by 
asking them to behave responsibly with regard to supporting their 
children and making them confront “legal complications” before 
exiting those relationships.
169
 In other words, Professor Schwartz 
emphasized that society supports and enforces family rights and 
responsibilities not only at the point of commitment but also, if 
necessary, at the dissolution of the adult partnership. This point is 
particularly relevant here because, while the responsible-procreation 
argument takes some account of a couple’s initial investment in 
having children, it wholly fails to account for the effects of a 
couple’s dissolution on the security of their children. 
Although the Hawaii trial court made detailed findings that 
rejected the state’s limited defense,
170
 the state courts did not have 
the final word. The now-familiar template of political backlash was 
set when a supermajority of state voters amended the Hawaii 
Constitution to grant authority to the state legislature to regulate 
marriage, which authorized recognition of “reciprocal beneficiaries” 
but denied same-sex marriage.
171
 
 
 166.  Id. at *11, *13–16 (Findings of Fact 83–85, 93–96, 102–106, 111–114). 
 167.  Id. at *11, *13, *15 (Findings of Fact 85, 93, 105, 111). 
 168.  Id. at *18 (Finding of Fact 139). 
 169.  Id. at *12 (Finding of Fact 87). 
 170.  Id. at *20. 
 171.  With 69 percent of the vote, Hawaii voters in November 1998 approved a constitutional 
amendment giving the legislature jurisdiction over marriage. GOLDBERG-HILLER, supra note 56, 
at 43. The legislature previously had enacted the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, recognizing some 
legal rights and benefits for same-sex couples. Id. at 42. According to Goldberg-Hiller, the 
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The substantive rulings of the Hawaii trial court proved to be not 
anomalous, however, as they were soon replicated by the Vermont 
Supreme Court in 1999.
172
 While Vermont’s high court conceded 
that the state has a legitimate interest “in promoting a permanent 
commitment between couples for the security of their children,”
173
 it 
squarely rejected the procreation justification for the same-sex-
marriage ban.
174
 The court held that Vermont extended the benefits 
of marriage to many opposite-sex couples “with no logical 
connection to the stated governmental goal” because they do not 
procreate, and it also held that there was an “extreme logical 
disjunction” between the state’s exclusion of same-sex couples and 
the state’s purpose of providing security for children because same-
sex couples who are raising children “are no differently situated with 
respect to this goal than their opposite-sex counterparts.”
175
 
VII.  A LIFT FROM CONSERVATIVE  
ACADEMICS AND ADVOCATES 
A leading academic defender of the same-sex-marriage ban soon 
stepped up to respond to the Vermont decision and give support to 
the responsible-procreation defense. In a law review article published 
in 2002, Lynn Wardle argued that “[a]llowing infertile heterosexual 
couples to marry, but not same-sex couples, conveys a very clear 
message of public policy—that responsible procreation is an 
important purpose of marriage, and that procreation should take 
place only within marriage.”
176
 Professor Wardle claimed boldly that 
same-sex marriages “generally do not advance the social interest in 
responsible procreation; rather, they impair the integrity of the 
institution that has best been able to further the social interests in 
responsible procreation.”
177
 Professor Wardle pulled few punches in 
that article, referring to the children of same-sex parents who were 
 
combination of the constitutional amendment and the legislation recognizing reciprocal 
beneficiaries was the result of a political compromise. Id. at 4. 
 172.  Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 173.  Id. at 881. 
 174.  Id. at 884. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Wardle, supra note 1, at 801. Professor Wardle focused much less on responsible 
procreation in an earlier article, mentioning it as one among eleven aspects of marriage “as it has 
evolved in our constitutional jurisprudence.” Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the 
Constitutional Right to Marry, 1790–1990, 41 HOW. L.J. 289, 336, 338–39 (1998). 
 177.  Wardle, supra note 1, at 797. 
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conceived with assisted reproductive technology as “orphans or half 
orphans, deliberately conceived to be raised in a unisex parenting 
environment,” and asserting that this raised “very serious concerns” 
about their welfare.
178
 
The attorney general of Indiana quickly translated Professor 
Wardle’s article into litigation arguments in an appellate brief. The 
case involved a state constitutional challenge to Indiana’s decision 
denying a three-day funeral leave to a state employee who suffered 
the death of her same-sex partner’s father (although such leave was 
granted to employees with opposite-sex spouses).
179
 In this sleeper 
test case, Cornell v. Hamilton,
180
 the Indiana attorney general’s brief 
launched a seemingly unnecessary but nonetheless full-blown 
defense of the state’s same-sex marriage prohibition.
181
 The attorney 
general argued that classifications distinguishing between same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples are constitutional because they promote 
procreation and child-rearing, promote sound political ordering, 
foster a free society, and protect the integrity of traditional 
marriage.
182
 The Indiana Court of Appeals squarely rejected the 
state’s “proffered justifications” relating to “promoting marriage and 
encouraging procreation” as “unpersuasive” because, in part, the 
funeral-leave policy “exists to strengthen family relationships, and 
families are different today than they once were.”
183
 The appellate 
court nonetheless also rejected the plaintiff’s state constitutional 
challenge solely because her appellate brief “curiously” had 
conceded that the policy was rationally related to marriage.
184
 
Four months after the Cornell decision, the high court of 
Massachusetts issued its much-anticipated and groundbreaking 4–3 
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
185
 which 
 
 178.  Wardle, supra note 1, at 803. Professor Wardle extended his critique of assisted 
reproduction in The Curious Case of the Missing Legal Analysis, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 309 (2004). 
 179.  Brief of Appellees at 27, Cornell v. Hamilton, 791 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 
49A02-0208-CV-635), 2002 WL 33952542, at *27. The attorney general’s brief cites repeatedly 
to Professor Wardle’s article. Id. at 27–28, 31–35. 
 180. 791 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 181.  Brief of Appellees, supra note 179, at 27–39. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Cornell, 791 N.E.2d at 219. 
 184.  Id. (“Curiously, however, Cornell concedes that the policy is rationally related to 
marriage.”); see also id. at 220 (“But for the legal act of marriage, we cannot discern how 
Cornell’s situation is different from that of other state employees involved in committed 
relationships. However, she concedes that a distinction based on marriage is rational.”). 
 185. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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directly rejected the responsible-procreation defense and held that the 
ban violated the state constitution.
186
 As Chief Justice Margaret 
Marshall succinctly summarized for the majority, “[t]he ‘marriage is 
procreation’ argument singles out the one unbridgeable difference 
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms that 
difference into the essence of legal marriage.”
187
 She further 
explained that this “confers an official stamp of approval on the 
destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently 
unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy 
of respect.”
188
 But Justice Cordy filed a particularly vigorous dissent, 
extensively citing conservative commentators such as Lynn Wardle 
and arguing that marriage functions to bind fathers to children and 
that the state rationally could conclude that recognizing same-sex 
marriages could diminish society’s ability to steer procreation into 
marriage.
189
 
VIII.  JUDICIAL TRACTION 
In 2003 and 2004, two intermediate appellate panels finally 
secured the initial footholds for the responsible-procreation defense 
in rejecting challenges to the same-sex-marriage bans in Arizona and 
Indiana. The appellate judges in Standhardt v. Superior Court
190
 and 
Morrison v. Sadler
191
 reasoned that the states’ means of limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples were rationally related to the 
purpose of encouraging responsible procreation. The reasoning in 
Morrison particularly drew links to poverty and single motherhood. 
The opinion cited Professor Wardle’s assertion that out-of-wedlock 
births resulting from opposite-sex intercourse resulted in “higher 
instances of physical and sexual child abuse, educational failure, and 
poverty.”
192
 The lower court then quoted at length from Justice 
Cordy’s dissenting opinion in Goodridge in which he argued that 
marriage fills the “void” and avoids the “chaotic” alternative “by 
 
 186.  Id. at 961–62. 
 187.  Id. at 962. 
 188.  Id. For an analysis of how the conservative defense of the same-sex-marriage ban 
reflects sex stereotyping, see Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-
Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007). 
 189.  Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995–1003 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
 190.  Standhardt v. Superior Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
 191.  821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
 192.  Id. at 24 n.11. 
  
Spring 2012] RESPONSIBLE PROCREATION 815 
formally binding the husband-father to his wife and child, and 
imposing on him the responsibilities of fatherhood,”
193
 echoing again 
the primary theme of welfare reform. 
Conservative amicus briefs began to emphasize Indiana’s 
intermediate appellate court decision in Morrison as support for the 
proposition that responsible procreation had been deemed to be a 
rational and sufficient justification for denying same-sex marriage. 
For example, during litigation challenging Maryland’s same-sex-
marriage ban, amicus briefs submitted on behalf of James Q. Wilson 
and the Maryland Catholic Conference, as well as the state’s reply 
brief, cited Indiana’s intermediate appellate court decision as 
approving the responsible-procreation argument.
194
 Conservative 
briefs cited either Professor Wardle’s argument or the Indiana 
decision, or both, as support for the argument that a state’s interest in 
responsible procreation justified banning same-sex marriage.
195
 The 
emerging justification was framed in an unusual manner, however. 
Rather than explaining why the state had an interest in denying 
same-sex marriage or even how extending marriage to same-sex 
couples would harm any state interest, most of the arguments 
asserted instead that extending marriage to same-sex couples would 
not advance the state’s interest in encouraging responsible 
procreation among heterosexuals.
196
 While some courts adopted this 
 
 193.  Id. at 25–26 (citing Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995–96 (Cordy, J., dissenting)). 
 194.  See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellants at 12, Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) 
(No. 2499), 2006 WL 3905926, at *12; Brief for James Q. Wilson et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Conaway, 932 A.2d 571 (No. 2499), 2006 WL 2725660; 
Brief for Maryland Catholic Conference as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, 
Conaway, 932 A.2d 571 (No. 2499), 2006 WL 5263472.  
 195.  See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of James Q. Wilson et al., supra note 46, at 3–4; Final 
Amended Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 20; Brief of Appellees, supra 
note 179, at 27; Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 194; Brief for James Q. Wilson et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, supra note 194, at 26; Brief for Maryland 
Catholic Conference as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, supra note 194; Brief 
for N.J. Coalition to Preserve & Protect Marriage et al. as Amici Curiae at 15, 17, Lewis v. 
Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006), 2004 WL 5234683, at *15, 17. 
 196.  See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Family Institute of Connecticut in Support of the 
Defendants-Appellees at 2–3, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) 
(No. 17716), 2007 WL 4729865, at *2–3; Amicus Brief of Concerned Women for America & 
New York Family Policy Council at 14–15, Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 
103434/2004), 2006 WL 1930152, at *14–15; Brief of the New York State Catholic Conference 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Respondent at 62, Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1 (No. 
103434/2004), 2006 WL 1930153, at *62; Brief of Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Defendants-Respondents at 44–45, Samuels v. New York Department of Health, 29 
A.D.3d 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006), 
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unusual framing, others followed the more typical course of 
requiring the government to explain why it denied the right to marry 
to same-sex couples.
197
 
Conservatives gained considerable momentum during this 
period. One variation or another of the responsible-procreation 
argument
198
 was subsequently endorsed by plurality opinions of the 
state high courts of Washington in Andersen v. King County
199
 and of 
New York in Hernandez v. Robles,
200
 and by the majority opinion of 
Maryland’s high court in Conaway v. Deane.
201
 Along the way, a 
panel of the Eighth Circuit endorsed the defense as well.
202
 
This momentum was quickly interrupted, however, when 
executive branch officials began eschewing the defense. The states of 
 
2006 WL 1930156, at *44–45; Appellant State of Washington’s Reply to Supplemental Brief of 
Respondents Castle at 4–5, Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (Nos. 75934-1, 
75956-1), 2005 WL 1841352, at *5. 
 197.  Some courts focused on whether recognition of same-sex marriage would advance the 
encouragement of responsible procreation (and upheld the ban). E.g., Morrison v. Sadler, 821 
N.E.2d 15, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Other courts focused on whether recognition of same-sex 
marriage would undermine the encouragement of responsible procreation by heterosexual couples 
(and invalidated the ban). E.g., Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999). Some courts 
split on the proper framing. For example, the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Washington noted that court’s disagreement over framing, with the dissent framing the question 
as whether denying same-sex marriage furthers legitimate government interests whereas the 
plurality framed the question as whether allowing opposite-sex couples to marry furthers 
legitimate governmental interests. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 984–85. 
 198.  Slight variants of the responsible-procreation argument have been articulated. For 
example, as the Court of Appeals of Indiana recognized: “We are using the term ‘responsible 
procreation’ to mean the procreation and raising of children by persons who have contemplated, 
and are well-suited for, the required commitment and challenges of child-rearing. This is a slight 
re-wording of Professor Wardle’s definition of the term.” Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 25 n.13 (citing 
Wardle, supra note 1, at 782 n.24 (defining “responsible procreation” as “procreation by parents 
who share a clear, firm, permanent commitment to each other and to the protection and care of 
children who are the offspring of their procreative union”)). 
 199.  138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (plurality opinion). “We conclude that limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples furthers the State’s interests in procreation and encouraging families with a 
mother and father and children biologically related to both.” Id. at 985. 
 200.  855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (plurality opinion). “The Legislature could find that unstable 
relationships between people of the opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be 
born into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that 
promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships will help children more.” Id. at 7. 
 201.  932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007). “This ‘inextricable link’ between marriage and procreation 
reasonably could support the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman only, because 
it is that relationship that is capable of producing biological offspring of both members (advances 
in reproductive technologies notwithstanding).” Id. at 630–31. 
 202.  Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867 (8th Cir. 2006). The 
responsible-procreation argument also was raised and endorsed in federal proceedings related to 
bankruptcy in In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 145 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) and interstate marriage 
recognition in Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308–09 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
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Connecticut and New Jersey explicitly disavowed any reliance on the 
responsible-procreation defense during the litigation over their state 
bans on same-sex marriage.
203
 As mentioned, the U.S. Department of 
Justice also now disavows any reliance on the responsible-
procreation defense as justification for DOMA.
204
 Along the way, the 
judiciary reversed course as well when the high courts of California 
and Iowa rejected the defense.
205
 
IX.  THE PROTRACTED  
(AND PENDING)  
BATTLE IN CALIFORNIA 
The responsible-procreation defense is receiving its most 
rigorous consideration during California’s pending battle over same-
sex marriage. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of California’s 
emergence as ground zero in the battle over responsible procreation 
is that the defense makes little sense in California because state 
public policy clearly contradicts it. Other than Prop 8’s effect of 
amending the state constitution to ban the official designation of 
marriage for same-sex couples, California broadly grants equal rights 
regardless of sexual orientation.
206
 For example, the state legislature 
enacted a series of statutes that prohibit discrimination based on 
sexual orientation in employment, public accommodations, housing, 
and, most saliently, parenting;
207
 the legislature also conferred all the 
same state rights on domestic partners, including parental rights, that 
married spouses enjoy.
208
 Not only did California’s highest court rule 
that the state constitution prohibited banning same-sex marriage 
before voters approved Prop 8
209
 but it also continues to require strict 
 
 203.  Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 477–78 (Conn. 2008); Lewis v. 
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 205–06 (N.J. 2006). 
 204.  Reply to Motion to Dismiss, Smelt, supra note 153, at pt. 3, at 6–7; Motion to Dismiss, 
Gill, supra note 153, at 19 n.10. 
 205.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 430–33 (Cal. 2008), superseded in part by 
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899–902 
(Iowa 2009). 
 206.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 428–30. 
 207.  For a description of this statutory history, see In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
675, 694–97 (Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded 
in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 208.  Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 77 (Cal. 2009). 
 209.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded in part by constitutional 
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. In enacting Prop 8, voters stripped the designation of 
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scrutiny for discrimination based on sexual orientation.
210
 In 
addition, the state’s supreme court has interpreted state statutes to 
recognize that a child can have two parents of the same sex,
211
 to 
permit second-parent adoptions by a same-sex partner,
212
 and to 
enforce child-support obligations by a non-biological same-sex 
parent.
213
 The court also enforced a pre-birth declaration of joint 
parentage that a parent had signed with her former same-sex 
partner.
214
 
With both the state’s legislature and its courts broadly 
recognizing same-sex relationships and parentage and the threat that 
California might be required to recognize same-sex marriages 
allowed by some other state,
215
 it was no surprise that anti-gay-rights 
advocates turned to the voters. The battle began with the initiative 
known as Proposition 22, which voters approved in November 2000 
and amended the state’s family law statute by adding the language: 
“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized 
in California.”
216
 A few years later, the mayor of San Francisco 
 
marriage that had been mandated for same-sex couples by this California Supreme Court 
decision. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 59. 
 210.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441–42. Even after the voters approved Prop 8 and 
thereby amended the state constitution to deny same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court affirmed 
that discrimination based on sexual orientation would trigger strict scrutiny. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 
73, 78. For a particularly insightful examination of Strauss v. Horton, see Anna Marie Smith, The 
Paradoxes of Popular Constitutionalism: Proposition 8 and Strauss v. Horton, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 
517 (2010). With regard to the effect of the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Strauss on the 
pending federal challenge to the constitutionality of Prop 8, Professor Smith emphasized two 
points, which are particularly relevant here: first, “Strauss characterizes Proposition 8 as the fruit 
of ideological traditionalism,” which is not a sufficient justification under current constitutional 
jurisprudence; and second, “since domestic partners have the same parental rights and duties as 
married couples under state law, it would contradict California’s legal history to say that the State 
has a legitimate interest in restricting child-rearing to married heterosexuals and Proposition 8 is a 
reasonable means for the pursuit of that objective.” Id. at 530–31, 534–35 (footnote omitted). 
 211.  K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 681 (Cal. 2005). California is not alone in confronting 
decisions about parentage for children born with biological links to both members of a same-sex 
couple (one genetic mother and another gestational mother). Most recently an intermediate 
appellate panel in Florida followed and quoted the conclusion from K.M.: “[W]hen partners in a 
lesbian relationship decide to produce children in this manner, both the woman who provides her 
ova and her partner who bears the children are the children’s parents.” T.M.H. v. D.M.T., No. 
5D09-3559, 2011 WL 6437247, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2011) (emphasis added in 
T.M.H.) (quoting K.M., 117 P.3d at 675). 
 212.  Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 570 (Cal. 2003). 
 213.  Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670–71 (Cal. 2005). 
 214.  Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 696 (Cal. 2005). 
 215.  See Smith, supra note 210, at 523. 
 216.  Id. (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5(a) (West 2012)). 
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authorized the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples,
217
 
but the California Supreme Court quickly halted the issuance of 
licenses and nullified the mayor-authorized marriages, ruling that 
only the state, not counties or municipalities, may define marriage.
218
 
San Francisco and other parties then filed several actions challenging 
the same-sex-marriage ban as a violation of the state constitution, 
and the California Supreme Court ruled the ban unconstitutional in 
May 2008.
219
 
In this state court litigation challenging the ban on its merits, the 
state did not raise the responsible-procreation defense, but the ban’s 
proponents asserted it.
220
 The California Supreme Court nonetheless 
rejected the responsible-procreation argument as not providing an 
appropriate basis for limiting the scope of the constitutional right to 
marry
221
 because the constitutional right to marry is equally 
important to both those who procreate accidentally and those who 
procreate responsibly
222
 and because family stability is equally 
important to children raised by same-sex couples and to children 
raised by opposite-sex couples.
223
 
Following the California Supreme Court’s decision in May 2008 
that invalidated the same-sex-marriage ban on state constitutional 
grounds, approximately 18,000 same-sex marriages were performed 
before California voters approved Prop 8 in November 2008.
224
 The 
language of Prop 8 simply repeated the language of the prior 
 
 217.  See Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 464–65 n.4 (Cal. 2004) 
(discussing the mayor’s belief that the equal protection clause of the California Constitution 
provides that marriage licenses should be issued on a “non-discriminatory basis, without regard to 
gender or sexual orientation”). 
 218.  Id. at 472. 
 219.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402–03 (Cal. 2008), superseded in part by 
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 220.  Id. at 430. 
 221.  Id. at 431. 
 222.  Id. at 431–32. 
 223.  Id. at 433. The reasoning of the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases 
seems to echo two major rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Cleveland Board of Education v. 
LaFleur, the Court invalidated state bans of continued employment of pregnant public school 
teachers because the rules served “to hinder attainment” of the very objectives the rules were 
“purportedly designed to promote.” 414 U.S. 632, 643 (1974). In New Jersey Welfare Rights 
Organization v. Cahill, the Court invalidated the New Jersey’s ban on receipt of welfare benefits 
by non-marital families because it operated “in practical effect” to deny benefits to “illegitimate” 
children for whom the benefits “are as indispensable to the health and well-being” as they are for 
marital children. 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973). 
 224.  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). 
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statutory ban: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid 
or recognized in California.”
225
 Challengers quickly filed an action 
with the California Supreme Court arguing primarily that Prop 8 
should be characterized as a “revision” rather than an “amendment” 
of the state constitution and therefore should have followed the 
state’s more robust procedure for enactment of a constitutional 
revision. But the California Supreme Court rejected this technical 
challenge.
226
 After internal consideration and debate, gay-rights 
organizations decided not to bring a further federal constitutional 
challenge but instead pledged to overturn Prop 8 at the ballot box.
227
 
When gay-rights organizations did not file a federal challenge to 
Prop 8, an unlikely pair of nationally prominent lawyers—Ted Olson 
from the right and David Boies from the left—brought the suit 
instead.
228
 Much of the initial press focused on why and how these 
strange bedfellows decided to represent two same-sex couples to 
claim that Prop 8 violated the federal constitution.
229
 As events 
unfolded, however, the controversy shifted focus to who would 
defend Prop 8. The plaintiffs filed suit against California’s then-
Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger; its then-Attorney General, Jerry 
Brown; the director and deputy director of public health; and the two 
county clerks who had denied the plaintiffs’ marriage licenses.
230
 
Each of the state defendants declined to defend Prop 8.
231
 The trial 
court subsequently granted leave to intervene to five individuals that 
established the organization Protect Marriage, which comprised the 
coalition of individuals and organizations that campaigned to enact 
Prop 8.
232
 Protect Marriage included a network of 1,700 pastors, as 
well as Evangelical, Catholic, and Mormon groups.
233
 The trial court 
 
 225.  Id. at 927 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5). 
 226.  Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60, 122 (Cal. 2009). 
 227.  Maura Dolan, Amendment Ease Draws Activists’ Ire, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2009, at 
A35. For an insightful analysis of the strategic decisions made by gay-rights advocates and how 
they might be understood within the framework of legal mobilization, see Douglas NeJaime, 
Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011). 
 228.  Ted Olson and David Boies sparred most prominently in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000). 
 229.  See e.g., Bill Moyers Journal (PBS television broadcast Feb. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02262010/watch.html. 
 230.  Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 953–54. 
 231.  Id. at 928. 
 232.  Id. at 928, 954–56. 
 233.  Id. at 955–56. 
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also granted the City and County of San Francisco leave to intervene 
as a plaintiff.
234
 
At trial, the proponents (1) abandoned their prior campaign 
reliance on morality as a defense of Prop 8;
235
 (2) failed to fulfill 
their promise to provide evidence demonstrating “twenty-three 
specific harmful consequences” caused by allowing same-sex 
marriage;
236
 and (3) withdrew four of their six designated 
witnesses.
237
 Proponents called only two witnesses: one think-tank 
founder whose credibility was undermined by his failure to support 
his opinions with reliable evidence or otherwise explain his 
methodology,
238
 and one professor of government whose credibility 
was undermined by the inconsistency between his testimony and his 
prior publications, and by his minimal familiarity with issues relating 
to the relative political power of lesbians and gays.
239
 As a result, the 
district court limited the weight given to the witnesses’ opinions due 
to their lack of relevant expertise and insufficient reliability.
240
 
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, called eight lay witnesses and 
nine expert witnesses, including two historians (from Harvard and 
Yale),
241
 two economists (with Ph.D. degrees from UC Berkeley),
242
 
three psychologists (from UCLA, UC Davis, and Cambridge),
243
 a 
social epidemiologist (from Columbia),
244
 and a political scientist 
(from Stanford).
245
 The trial court found that each of the plaintiffs’ 
expert witnesses were “amply qualified” by their education and 
 
 234.  Id. at 928–29. 
 235.  Id. at 930–31. 
 236.  Id. at 931. 
 237.  Id. at 944. 
 238.  Id. at 945–50. 
 239.  Id. at 950–52. David Blankenhorn, the think-tank founder who was found not to be 
credible by the federal district court, was one of the commentators cited by the proponents of 
California’s same-sex-marriage ban during the state litigation as a key supporter of the 
responsible-procreation defense. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 432 (Cal. 2008), superseded 
in part by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. Professor Lynn Wardle and 
conservative advocate Maggie Gallagher were the other two commentators cited by the California 
Supreme Court as experts who believed that same-sex marriage would send a message that 
“would sever the link that marriage provides between procreation and child rearing.” See id. at 
432–33. 
 240.  See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 950, 952. 
 241.  Id. at 940. 
 242.  Id. at 941–42. 
 243.  Id. at 942–43. 
 244.  Id. at 942. 
 245.  Id. at 943. 
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experience and demonstrated comfort with the subjects of their 
expertise.
246
 
The district court described the evidence as focusing on three 
broad questions, which were used to summarize the testimony.
247
 
The first question was whether any evidence showed that California 
had an interest in refusing to recognize marriage between two people 
because of their sex, but the district court found no basis in the 
record for any government interest in a differentiation based on 
sex.
248
 The second question was whether any evidence showed that 
California had an interest in differentiating between same-sex and 
opposite-sex unions, and the district court again found no basis in the 
record for any government interest in differentiating based on sexual 
orientation.
249
 The third question was whether the evidence showed 
that Prop 8 enacted private moral disapproval of same-sex couples 
without advancing any legitimate government interest, and the 
district court answered affirmatively and concluded that “[t]he 
evidence demonstrated beyond serious reckoning that Prop 8 finds 
support only in such disapproval.”
250
 
The district court then made roughly eighty factual findings 
supported by over 330 subparts citing to specific evidence in the 
record, and it further incorporated seventy-five citations to evidence 
in its legal analysis.
251
 These factual findings variously described: the 
parties;
252
 the civil and consensual basis of marriage;
253
 the historical 
and contemporary absence of any requirement of ability or 
willingness to procreate;
254
 the racial and gendered history of 
marriage;
255
 the contemporary functions of marriage;
256
 the 
contemporary understanding of sexual orientation;
257
 the 
comparative abilities of same-sex and opposite-sex couples;
258
 the 
 
 246.  Id. at 940. 
 247.  Id. at 932. 
 248.  Id. at 932–34. 
 249.  Id. at 934–36. 
 250.  Id. at 936–38. 
 251.  Id. at 953–91. 
 252.  Id. at 953–56 (Findings of Fact 1–18). 
 253.  Id. at 956 (Findings of Fact 19–20). 
 254.  Id. (Finding of Fact 21). 
 255.  Id. at 957–61 (Findings of Fact 22–33). 
 256.  Id. at 961–63 (Findings of Fact 34–41). 
 257.  Id. at 963–67 (Findings of Fact 42–47). 
 258.  Id. at 967–70 (Findings of Fact 48–51). 
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differences between domestic partnership and marriage;
259
 the effects 
of same-sex marriage;
260
 the effects, costs, and burdens of Prop 8;
261
 
the factors affecting a child’s well-being;
262
 and both historical and 
contemporary discrimination against gays.
263
 
In its legal analysis, the district court frequently cited evidence 
that showed that the Prop 8 campaign had relied on fears that 
exposing children to the concept of same-sex marriage would cause 
them to become gay or lesbian, which was treated as an outcome that 
parents should dread.
264
 The district court also found that the 
campaign specifically relied on stereotypes that same-sex 
relationships are inferior to opposite-sex relationships.
265
 Although 
the proponents of Prop 8 abandoned their campaign’s morality-based 
justification for Prop 8 at trial, the district court nonetheless found 
that the evidence at trial revealed that a belief that opposite-sex 
couples are morally superior to same-sex couples was “the most 
likely explanation for its passage” and that the campaign played on 
fears about the dangers of exposing children to homosexuality; the 
court also found that the evidence at trial demonstrated that those 
fears were “completely unfounded.”
266
 The district court concluded 
that Prop 8 enacted “a private moral view that same-sex couples are 
inferior,” which alone was an improper basis for denying rights and 
was not supported by any rational justification.
267
 
The district court’s legal analysis grappled with several thorny 
constitutional issues. Given that marriage is a fundamental right, the 
court first analyzed whether the plaintiffs sought to exercise this right 
or sought recognition of some new right.
268
 Courts look to history 
and tradition as one method to determine if a right is fundamental 
 
 259.  Id. at 970–72 (Findings of Fact 52–54). 
 260.  Id. at 972–73 (Findings of Fact 55–56). 
 261.  Id. at 973–80 (Findings of Fact 57–68). 
 262.  Id. at 980–81 (Findings of Fact 69–73). 
 263.  Id. at 981–91 (Findings of Fact 74–80). 
 264.  Id. at 988–90, 1001–03 (citing repeatedly to Finding of Fact 79). 
 265.  Id. at 990–91, 1001–03 (citing repeatedly to Finding of Fact 80). 
 266.  Id. at 1002–03. 
 267.  Id. at 1003 (“Moral disapproval alone is an improper basis on which to deny rights to 
gay men and lesbians. The evidence shows conclusively that Proposition 8 enacts, without reason, 
a private moral view that same-sex couples are inferior to opposite-sex couples. Because 
Proposition 8 disadvantages gays and lesbians without any rational justification, Proposition 8 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
 268.  Id. at 992. 
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under the U.S. Constitution.
269
 While marriage is traditional,
270
 it 
also has undergone enormous change. For example, the district court 
emphasized that racial restrictions that were “once common” are now 
“shameful” and unconstitutional and that “once-unquestioned” 
gender restrictions, such as the husband’s “coverture” of his wife, are 
now regarded as “antithetical to the notion of marriage as a union of 
equals.”
271
 The district court, therefore, focused on those 
characteristics of marriage that have survived throughout history and 
described the core components of marriage as two parties freely 
consenting to form a relationship that forms the foundation of a 
household, including mutual support of one another and of any 
dependents.
272
  
The district court noted that the state regulates marriage to 
encourage stable households but respects an individual’s choice to 
build family relationships because they are central to life.
273
 The 
district court emphasized that the state has “never” inquired into 
procreative capacity or intent before issuing a marriage license and 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that treating marriage as 
“simply about the right to have sexual intercourse” would demean 
it.
274
 The district court turned to the evidence at trial and concluded 
that the traditional exclusion of same-sex couples in the United 
States was never about procreation but was “an artifact of a time 
when the genders were seen as having distinct roles in society and in 
marriage,” which has now passed.
275
 The district court also 
emphasized that same-sex couples are situated identically to 
opposite-sex couples regarding their ability to perform the core rights 
and obligations of marriage.
276
 
 
 269.  Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997)). 
 270.  Id. (acknowledging that neither party disputed the ability to marry as a fundamental 
right). 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)). 
 275.  Id. at 993. 
 276.  Id. (Finding of Fact 48) (citing to eleven evidentiary sources, including relevant 
admissions by proponents and the attorney general, psychological research and opinions, and 
demographical data showing no meaningful differences between opposite-sex couples and the 
more than 107,000 same-sex couples in California who live throughout the state, who are racially 
and ethnically diverse, who depend on one another financially, who participate in the economy, 
and 18 percent of whom are raising children). 
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The court provided a detailed analysis of the differences 
between domestic partnerships and marriage in its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.
277
 The district court noted that the 
proponents did not dispute the “significant symbolic disparity” 
between the two statuses and ruled that domestic partnerships are “a 
substitute and inferior institution” that do not satisfy the state’s 
constitutional obligations under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses.
278
 
Regarding the protection of the fundamental right to marry 
under the Due Process Clause, the district court noted that courts 
must apply strict scrutiny when legislation infringes on fundamental 
rights and that a majority of voters may not deny such rights.
279
 The 
district court then reasoned that, because Prop 8 failed even rational 
basis review, it could not survive strict scrutiny and therefore 
violated due process.
280
 The district court turned to its equal 
protection analysis and reasoned that, even under rational basis 
review, courts must “insist on knowing the relation between the 
classification adopted and the object to be attained”
281
 to “find some 
footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.”
282
 
The district court further emphasized that courts may look to 
evidence
283
 as one means to ensure some rational basis for the ban, 
other than merely disadvantaging the group burdened.
284
 
The district court then circumvented two potentially difficult 
dilemmas: (1) choosing between sex discrimination and sexual-
orientation discrimination to frame the case; and (2) distinguishing 
between sexual orientation as a status or as conduct. With regard to 
the first, the trial court found that sexual-orientation discrimination 
and sex discrimination are “necessarily interrelated” and thus 
“equivalent” claims both because sexual orientation informs the sex 
of one’s intimate partner and because the sex of one’s intimate 
 
 277.  Id. at 970–72 (Findings of Fact 52–54), 993–94. 
 278.  Id. at 994, 1004. 
 279.  Id. at 994–95 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978); W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
 280.  Id. at 995. 
 281.  Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 
U.S. 312, 321 (1993)). 
 282.  Id. (citing Heller, 509 U.S. at 321). 
 283.  Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982)). 
 284.  Id. at 995–96 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633; U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 534 (1973)). 
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partner defines one’s sexual orientation.
285
 With regard to the 
second, the proponents’ argument that Prop 8 targets mere conduct 
and not identity, the trial court relied on the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Lawrence—affirmed recently in Christian Legal Society 
v. Martinez
286
—which similarly rejected any distinction between 
status and conduct with regard to sexual orientation.
287
 The district 
court then cautiously avoided a skirmish about the standard of review 
by finding that, while the evidence showed that classifications based 
on sexual orientation appeared suspect and therefore should be 
subjected to strict scrutiny, Prop 8 failed even rational basis review 
because the proposition is not rationally related to any legitimate 
state interest.
288
 The court came to this conclusion after considering 
all six governmental interests asserted by the ballot proponents, 
including interests related to (1) tradition; (2) caution; (3) responsible 
procreation and parenting; (4) freedom to discriminate; (5) 
difference; and (6) the catchall.
289
 
Although state officials declined to defend Prop 8,
290
 the district 
court considered each of the purported governmental interests that 
the Prop 8 proponents proffered.
291
 First, regarding tradition, the 
district court rejected preserving the traditional definition of marriage 
because tradition alone is not a sufficient justification for continued 
discrimination.
292
 Also, evidence at trial showed that much of the 
tradition was based on the “artifact” of gender roles or on preferring 
 
 285.  Id. at 996. The trial court nonetheless described sexual orientation discrimination as “a 
phenomenon distinct from, but related to, sex discrimination.” Id. 
 286. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 287.  Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003); 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990). Seven years before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lawrence 
overruled its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which had upheld 
legislation that criminalized same-sex sexual conduct, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer argued 
that the majority there should have distinguished between status and conduct. 517 U.S. at 644 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the greater power to criminalize and/or 
disapprove of same-sex conduct included the lesser power to deny civil rights to those who 
engage in such conduct. Id. at 644–45. Thus, the Court implicitly rejected the status-conduct 
distinction in 1996 in Romer, and it explicitly rejected the distinction in 2003 in Lawrence and 
reaffirmed that rejection in 2010 in Martinez. For a more detailed discussion of the import of the 
Martinez decision, see Julie A. Nice, How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment of CLS v. 
Martinez, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631 (2011). 
 288.  Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997. 
 289.  Id. at 998–1002. 
 290.  Id. at 928. 
 291.  Id. at 998–1002. 
 292.  Id. at 998. 
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opposite-sex relationships, which is itself discriminatory and 
tautological.
293
 
Second, regarding caution, the district court emphasized that the 
evidence at trial showed no negative effects of same-sex marriage; 
thus, the state did not have any governmental interest in acting 
incrementally to decrease the probability of negative effects.
294
 
Third, regarding responsible procreation and parenting, the 
district court noted that this category encompassed the proponents’ 
largest group of purported state interests.
295
 The district court found 
that fertility was the only difference that the proponents identified 
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples but that the proponents 
failed to present any evidence about why sexual orientation should 
be used as a proxy for fertility or why fertility should be considered 
with regard to marriage,
296
 especially considering that the state had 
never required marriage applicants to demonstrate procreative 
capacity or intent.
297
 The district court nonetheless considered 
whether any evidence supported the argument that Prop 8 advanced 
responsible procreation or parenting and found no such evidence.
298
 
Regarding procreation, the district court found that the evidence 
showed that Prop 8 “does not make it more likely that opposite-sex 
couples will marry and raise offspring biologically related to both 
parents”
299
 and further that Prop 8 actually harms any interest in 
channeling sexual activity to marriage because it effectively requires 
“some sexual activity and child-bearing and child-rearing to occur 
outside marriage.”
300
 Regarding parenting, the district court found 
that Prop 8 did not affect who could or should become parents.
301
 
Moreover, the evidence at trial demonstrated that same-sex and 
opposite-sex parents are of “equal quality,”
302
 “parents’ genders are 
 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Id. at 998–99. 
 295.  Id. at 999. 
 296.  Id. at 997. 
 297.  Id. at 992. 
 298.  Id. at 999–1000. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  Id. at 1000. 
 301.  Id. (“Proposition 8 has nothing to do with children, as Proposition 8 simply prevents 
same-sex couples from marrying. Same-sex couples can have (or adopt) and raise children. When 
they do, they are treated identically to opposite-sex parents under California law.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 302.  Id. at 999. 
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irrelevant to children’s developmental outcomes,”
303
 and Prop 8 
actually undermines any state interest in family stability because it 
makes same-sex families less stable.
304
 
Fourth, regarding the freedom of those who oppose same-sex 
marriage, the district court rejected the purported government 
interests as a matter of law based on two prior California Supreme 
Court decisions that found that Prop 8 does not affect any First 
Amendment rights
305
 and that the state’s antidiscrimination law 
otherwise prohibits discrimination between same-sex unions and 
opposite-sex marriages.
306
 
Fifth, regarding purported differences, the district court found 
that same-sex and opposite-sex couples are “exactly the same” “for 
all purposes relevant to California law”
307
 and also that Prop 8 
hinders any state interest in administrative convenience by requiring 
the maintenance of two separate institutional schemes for California 
couples.
308
 
Finally, the district court rejected the proponents’ attempt to 
preserve any conceivable “catchall” interest identified at any later 
stage of the litigation because the proponents already had an “ample 
opportunity” at trial to identify interests other than fear or 
discrimination.
309
 
The district court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that 
Prop 8 fit the purported justifications “so poorly” that the most likely 
explanation for the law was a belief in the moral superiority of 
opposite-sex couples.
310
 Moreover, the district court found that the 
evidence demonstrated that the Prop 8 campaign relied on negative 
stereotypes, fear, and moral disapproval of gays,
311
 and that these 
messages about gays were “completely unfounded.”
312
 Given the 
“overwhelming evidence” demonstrating that Prop 8 violated the due 
 
 303.  Id. at 1000. 
 304.  Id. 
 305.  Id. (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451–52 (Cal. 2008), superseded in part 
by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5). 
 306.  Id. at 1000–01 (citing Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 115 P.3d 1212, 1217–
18 (Cal. 2005)). 
 307.  Id. at 1001. 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. at 1001–02. 
 310.  Id. at 1002–03. 
 311.  Id. 
 312.  Id. at 1003. 
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process and equal protection rights of the plaintiffs,
313
 the district 
court held that Prop 8 was unconstitutional and permanently enjoined 
its enforcement.
314
 
While the district court’s meticulous analysis seemed to portend 
a resounding victory for same-sex couples, the proponents of Prop 8 
pursued an appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
315
 The substitution of the 
ballot proponents as the sole defenders of Prop 8 initially confounded 
the judiciary.
316
 Because the proponents, rather than the state, 
decided the defense strategy, the defense reflected the proponents’ 
ideological interests rather than the state’s governmental interests.
317
 
On a more technical level, a related and serious question emerged on 
appeal about whether the proponents had constitutional standing to 
pursue an appeal given that they were not elected by the voters to 
represent the interests of the state.
318
 
 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Id. at 1004. 
 315.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 316.  Id. (“[W]e are now convinced that Proponents’ claim to standing depends on 
Proponents’ particularized interests created by state law or their authority under state law to 
defend the constitutionality of the initiative, which rights it appears to us have not yet been 
clearly defined by the Court. We therefore request clarification in order to determine whether we 
have jurisdiction to decide this case.”). 
 317.  Id. at 1197 (discussing the particularized interest the proponents may have had in 
enacting Prop 8 relative to the government’s own interest). 
 318.  Id. at 1195. No state defendant opted to appeal the trial court ruling, but the Prop 8 
proponents filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit. Id. The Ninth Circuit promptly ordered the 
proponents to address the question of standing in their opening brief. Id. After considering the 
parties’ briefs, the Ninth Circuit certified the standing question to the California Supreme Court. 
Id. at 1199. The California Supreme Court held that “the official proponents of a voter-approved 
initiative measure are authorized [under the California Constitution] to assert the state’s interest in 
an initiative’s validity” “when the public officials . . . decline to [defend a law].” Perry v. Brown, 
265 P.3d 1002, 1033 (Cal. 2011). 
  Should the Prop 8 proponents appeal the Ninth Circuit decision to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, standing may once again become an issue. While the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled 
definitively on the question of whether initiative proponents have standing to defend the 
constitutionality of their initiative, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed an appeal by an 
initiative proponent for lack of standing. See Don’t Bankrupt Wash. Comm. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l 
Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 460 U.S 1077 (1983). In another case, the Supreme Court also 
expressed “grave doubts” that ballot initiative proponents would have standing to appeal in lieu of 
government officials. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 (1997). In 
the Arizona case, the Supreme Court highlighted the lack of any state law appointing initiative 
sponsors to serve as agents of the people, in lieu of public officials, to defend the constitutionality 
of an enacted initiative. Id. at 65. The California Supreme Court distinguished Arizonans from 
Perry because California law did authorize the proponents of a ballot initiative to assert the state’s 
interest. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1013–14. 
  Whether or not ending litigation regarding a constitutional issue on a technical basis is 
desirable, it is not unusual. See, e.g., Don’t Bankrupt Wash. Comm., 460 U.S. at 1077. A federal 
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X.  ECHOES OF  
LOVING ON APPEAL 
In appealing the district court decision to the Ninth Circuit, the 
Prop 8 proponents first faced the task of defending their standing to 
pursue an appeal, without which the Ninth Circuit would have no 
constitutional authority to decide the issue.
319
 With regard to the 
merits of the case, the proponents have relied on the arguments that 
sexual relationships between men and women naturally produce 
children and that society must protect itself from the threat posed by 
unwanted children by affirming the exclusive availability of marriage 
to heterosexuals.
320
 They also objected strenuously to the trial court’s 
reliance on social-science evidence.
321
 Indeed, constitutional scholars 
weighing in have disagreed as well about whether the voluminous 
evidence amassed at trial would matter.
322
 
Front and center in the Prop 8 appeal has been the comparison to 
Loving v. Virginia.
323
 In the most sustained comparison, the NAACP 
amicus brief argued that “the parallels between this case and Loving 
are evident in the rationales advanced by the proponents of 
Proposition 8, which bear a striking resemblance to those proffered 
by the Commonwealth of Virginia in its defense of the anti-
 
court has no discretion to proceed with a suit unless the court finds it has jurisdiction sufficient to 
satisfy Article III of the Constitution. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation 
of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 464 (1982). But exactly what constitutes the constitutional 
minimum requirement for standing remains unclear, as the Supreme Court itself conceded when 
noting that “the concept of ‘Art. III standing’ has not been defined with complete consistency in 
all of the various cases decided by this Court.” Id. at 475 (quotation marks omitted). 
 319.  The Ninth Circuit certified a question to the California Supreme Court asking whether 
California law entitled the ballot proponents to defend Prop 8 in lieu of state officials. Perry, 628 
F.3d at 1199. On November 17, 2011, the California Supreme Court announced that, in the 
absence of public officials willing to do so, the official Prop 8 proponents have authority under 
state law to defend the constitutionality of the initiative. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1032–33. 
 320.  Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 77–78, Perry, 628 F.3d 1191 (No. 
10-16696). 
 321.  Id. at 88. 
 322.  For example, during San Francisco’s KQED broadcast of Forum hosted by Michael 
Krasny during the hour before the oral arguments, commentator David Levine opined that “the 
factual record is almost beside the point,” while law professor Eugene Volokh argued that the 
application of the rational basis test would involve a “difficult empirical question.” Forum with 
Michael Krasny: Prop. 8 Federal Appeal, KQED RADIO (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.kqed.org/a/ 
forum/R201012060900. 
 323.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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miscegenation statute at issue in Loving.”
324
 Indeed, the similarity 
between the arguments advanced in the proponents’ appellate briefs 
to the Ninth Circuit and the arguments made in the briefs filed before 
the Supreme Court in Loving is remarkable. The NAACP highlighted 
multiple examples in its brief.
325
 
The Commonwealth of Virginia’s brief to the Supreme Court 
emphasized that the constitutionality of interracial marriage bans had 
been “thoroughly settled” by an “exhaustive array of judicial 
authority” 
326
 in a “virtually uninterrupted line of judicial 
decisions”
327
 “covering a period of almost one hundred years.”
328
 
The Prop 8 proponents in the Perry appeal have asserted a nearly 
identical claim that the constitutionality of banning same-sex 
marriage is well settled.
329
 
Virginia’s brief also argued that “an inquiry into evidence of a 
scientific nature” was “clearly impermissible”
330
 and “irrelevant.”
331
 
The Prop 8 proponents similarly have argued against the 
consideration of evidence.
332
 
Virginia’s brief argued that the meaning of the original intent of 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot change over time, 
and it cited numerous statements from members of Congress that 
rejected any suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment might call 
the interracial marriage ban into question.
333
 Supporters of Prop 8 
similarly have argued that the original framers of the Fourteenth 
 
 324.  Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance of the District Court Judgment at 3, Perry, 628 F.3d 1191 
(No. 10-16696). 
 325.  Id. 
 326.  Brief & Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 5, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 395), 1967 WL 
93641, at *5. 
 327.  Id. at 32. 
 328.  Id. at 37. 
 329.  Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Reply Brief at 5, Perry, 628 F.3d 1191 (No. 10-
16696), 2010 WL 4622581, at *5 (“[E]very appellate court, both state and federal, to address the 
validity of traditional opposite-sex marriage laws under the United States Constitution has upheld 
them as rationally related to the state’s interest in responsible procreation and child-rearing.”). 
 330.  Brief & Appendix on Behalf of Appellee, supra note 326, at 6–7. 
 331.  Id. at 38. 
 332.  For example, Prop 8 proponents have argued that the Ninth Circuit owes no deference to 
the trial court’s findings of fact because they are “legislative facts” rather than “adjudicative 
facts.” Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 329, at 20–24. 
 333.  Brief & Appendix on Behalf of Appellee, supra note 326, at 9–31. 
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Amendment would not have intended for it to prohibit banning same-
sex marriage.
334
 
Virginia’s brief stressed the fact that the Supreme Court had 
denied certiorari in a challenge to Alabama’s interracial marriage ban 
just six months after it had decided Brown v. Board of Education.
335
 
The Prop 8 proponents have made a similar technical argument that 
the Supreme Court already decided the constitutional question when 
it previously dismissed a same-sex marriage case for want of a 
substantial federal question.
336
 
Virginia’s brief quoted at length from Naim v. Naim,
337
 which 
discussed the concurring and dissenting opinions in the California 
Supreme Court decision in Perez v. Sharp,
338
 which invalidated 
California’s interracial marriage ban.
339
 Opponents of same-sex 
marriage similarly have focused on the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Cordy in Goodridge.
340
 
Virginia’s brief highlighted what it characterized as “the 
definitive book on intermarriage” by Dr. Albert I. Gordon, which 
argued, for example, that “our obligation to children should tend to 
reduce the number of such marriages” and that “the tendency to 
classify all persons who oppose intermarriage as ‘prejudiced’ is, in 
itself, a prejudice.”
341
 Similarly, the same-sex-marriage briefs have 
featured the writings of social conservative scholars, such as Lynn 
 
 334.  See Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 329, at 47 (“[T]he clear 
and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of 
invidious racial discrimination in the States.” (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 335.  Brief & Appendix on Behalf of Appellee, supra note 326, at 34–35. 
 336.  See Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 329, at 15–18. 
 337.  87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955). 
 338.  198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
 339.  Brief & Appendix on Behalf of Appellee, supra note 326, at 36–37 (quoting Naim v. 
Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 753 (Va. Ct. App. 1955)). 
 340.  Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 320, at 90–91, 93 
(quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 999–1000, 1003 (Mass. 2003) 
(Cordy, J., dissenting)). 
 341.  Brief & Appendix on Behalf of Appellee, supra note 326, at 47–48 (quoting ALBERT I. 
GORDON, INTERMARRIAGE: INTERFAITH, INTERRACIAL, INTERETHNIC 334–35, 357 (1964)). 
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Wardle,
342
 and its authors have bristled at the suggestion that their 
defense of the ban reflects animus based on sexual orientation.
343
 
Virginia’s brief ended by arguing the judiciary may not invade 
“the exclusive province of the Legislature of each State” to decide 
whether to permit or prevent such alliances.
344
 This point has been 
one of the primary arguments made by supporters of Prop 8 as 
well.
345
 
Arguments made by the Lovings also bear remarkable similarity 
to those made by the challengers to the same-sex-marriage ban. Most 
saliently, while commentators frequently assume that the Loving 
dispute triggered strict scrutiny due to the presence of facial racial 
classifications,
346
 strict scrutiny was neither assumed nor asserted by 
the parties. Rather than invoking heightened scrutiny in their 
February 1967 brief to the Supreme Court, Mildred and Richard 
Loving argued that the question for both equal protection and due 
process was whether the interracial marriage ban had “a legitimate 
legislative purpose” and whether it bore “a reasonable relationship to 
such purpose.”
347
 
Just as the parties, courts, and commentators are now debating 
the meaning of Lawrence v. Texas, the Lovings noted that scholars 
then were unsure about the meaning of Brown v. Board of Education, 
specifically whether it meant that segregation constituted intentional 
 
 342.  Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 320, at 65 (citing Lynn 
Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the ‘Loving Analogy’ for 
Same-Sex Marriage, 51 HOW. L.J. 117, 180–81 (2007)). 
 343.  Id. at 105 (“[T]he inference of anti-gay hostility drawn by the district court is manifestly 
false. It defames more than seven million California voters as homophobic, a cruelly ironic 
charge, as noted earlier, given that California has enacted some of the Nation’s most progressive 
and sweeping gay-rights protections, including creation of a parallel institution, domestic 
partnerships, affording same-sex couples all the benefits and obligations of marriage.”). 
 344.  Brief & Appendix on Behalf of Appellee, supra note 326, at 7–8. 
 345.  See, e.g., Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 329, at 74 (“The 
Constitution simply does not authorize the judiciary to sit as a super legislature to second guess 
the wisdom or desirability of the balance the people of California have struck.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993))). 
 346.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, 
Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 656 & n.145 (2006) (citing to Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1967) to support the proposition that restricting marriage on racial 
classifications violates the central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 347.  Brief for Appellants at 39, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 395), 1967 WL 113927, at *39. 
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discrimination, lacked a rational basis, or constituted a denial of the 
freedom to associate.
348
 
The Lovings’ brief did not dither over the doctrinal level of 
scrutiny but instead focused squarely on understanding the ban 
within its historical and social context. For example, their brief 
demonstrated that the function of the interracial-marriage ban had 
changed over time, citing historical and scholarly evidence to show 
the evolution of the justification for banning interracial marriage 
from its religious and then economic roots to its later social 
justifications grounded in eugenics.
349
 The Lovings further 
emphasized the immeasurable social harm caused by the ban, citing 
Gunnar Myrdal’s explanation that the majority utilized “the dread of 
‘intermarriage’” to justify discrimination designed not only to protect 
the purity of the white race but also to keep African Americans in a 
lower status.
350
 Their brief also argued that the original legislative 
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was arguable and not 
determinative in any event, because the Fourteenth Amendment was 
“open-ended and meant to be expounded in light of changing times 
and circumstances.”
351
 Their brief finally stressed the lack of any 
evidence supporting the bans, noting that the state had not 
presented—and could not present—“reputable scientific evidence” to 
prove that persons of mixed race were “inferior.”
352
 
The Lovings ended their brief with points nearly identical to 
those of the Prop 8 challengers. First, they underscored the 
intertwinement of liberty and equality in arguing that the ban 
deprived personal liberty just as it denied equal protection.
353
 
Second, they argued that the ban was the last remaining vestige of 
the “elaborate legal structure of segregation” and thus the remaining 
symbol of the relegation of African Americans to “second-class 
citizenship.”
354
 Finally, they argued that, whether or not the Court 
 
 348.  Id. at 31–32 (citing scholarly articles in the Yale Law Journal, Georgetown Law 
Journal, and Harvard Law Review). In an earlier section, the brief again noted the uncertainty 
about Brown’s meaning in arguing that the principle of Brown, “however it is articulated,” makes 
clear the invalidity of the interracial marriage ban. Id. at 10. 
 349.  Id. at 16–24. 
 350.  Id. at 27. 
 351.  Id. at 10. 
 352.  Id. at 36. 
 353.  Id. at 38–39. 
 354.  Id. at 39–40. 
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had been wise to avoid the issue in the past, the time had come to 
strike down the ban.
355
 
Same-sex couples now stand in a nearly identical litigation 
posture to interracial couples prior to the path-breaking decision in 
Loving.
356
 What is more, nearly every argument made by both sides 
in the Prop 8 appeal has tracked the same argument made during the 
Loving litigation. But the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the Prop 8 
litigation would make only passing reference to Loving.
357
 
XI.  A RESOUNDING REJECTION  
BY THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Shortly before this Article went to press, a panel of the Ninth 
Circuit issued its 2–1 ruling in Perry v. Brown and affirmed the 
district court’s ruling that Prop 8 violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
358
 The panel determined that Romer v. Evans governed 
its analysis
359
 and concluded that Prop 8 served “no purpose,” and 
had “no effect, other than to lessen the statute and human dignity of 
gays and lesbians in California, and to officially reclassify their 
relationships and families as inferior to those of opposite-sex 
couples.”
360
 The panel resoundingly rejected the responsible-
procreation defense because Prop 8 had “no effect on the rights of 
same-sex couples to raise children or on the procreative practices of 
other couples,”
361
 given that California law affords same-sex couples 
the same rights as opposite-sex couples to enter into state-recognized 
relationships and to raise children together
362
 and that Prop 8 “in no 
 
 355.  Id. at 40. 
 356.  By no means does this comparison of argumentation within the constitutional litigation 
suggest that sexual orientation and race are identical. For a critique of making an analogy 
between racial minority rights and gay rights, see Devon Carbado & Russell Robinson, What’s 
Wrong with Gay Rights (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/1108.htm. 
 357.  Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *26 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 
2012). 
 358.  Id. at *1, *29. 
 359.  Id. at *17. 
 360.  Id. at *1. 
 361.  Id. 
 362.  Id. at *13 (citing provisions allowing same-sex couples to raise children together, enjoy 
the presumption of parentage, adopt each other’s children, become foster parents, share 
community property, file state taxes jointly, participate in a partner’s group health insurance 
policy, enjoy hospital visitation privileges, and make medical decisions for an incapacitated 
partner, among others). 
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way” altered state law governing childrearing and procreation.
363
 The 
panel reasoned, moreover, that “to explain how rescinding access to 
the designation of ‘marriage’ is rationally related to the State’s 
interest in responsible procreation, Proponents would have had to 
argue that opposite-sex couples were more likely to procreate 
accidentally or irresponsibly when same-sex couples were allowed 
access to the designation of ‘marriage.’”
364
 The panel further 
emphasized that it was “aware of no basis on which this argument 
would be even conceivably plausible.”
365
 
As a technical matter, the Ninth Circuit panel framed its ruling 
narrowly to establish binding precedent only as to the 
unconstitutionality of Prop 8 and did not purport to resolve the 
broader question of whether a state may ever deny same-sex couples 
the right to marry.
366
 But the panel’s decision wholly rejected the 
functional arguments primarily advanced in defense of Prop 8. The 
panel found no actual or conceivable rational relation between 
stripping the designation of marriage and the purported state interests 
in encouraging responsible procreation and child rearing,
367
 
proceeding with caution (which was also advanced by Prop 8’s 
proponents), as well as protecting religious liberty and protecting 
children (which were proffered by amici curiae).
368
 Repeatedly 
 
 363.  Id. at *22. 
 364.  Id. at *21. 
 365.  Id. The panel further explained:  
There is no rational reason to think that taking away the designation of ‘marriage’ from 
same-sex couples would advance the goal of encouraging California’s opposite-sex 
couples to procreate more responsibly. . . . It is implausible to think that denying two 
men or two women the right to call themselves married could somehow bolster the 
stability of families headed by one man and one woman. 
Id. at *21, *23. 
 366.  Id. at *1 (“Whether under the Constitution same-sex couples may ever be denied the 
right to marry, a right that has long been enjoyed by opposite-sex couples, is an important and 
highly controversial question. . . . We need not and do not answer the broader question in this 
case, however, because California had already extended to committed same-sex couples both the 
incidents of marriage and the official designation of ‘marriage,’ and Proposition 8’s only effect 
was to take away that important and legally significant designation, while leaving in place all of 
its incidents. This unique and strictly limited effect of Proposition 8 allows us to address the 
amendment’s constitutionality on narrow grounds.”). 
 367.  Id. at *22 (“Proposition 8 in no way alters the state laws that govern childrearing and 
procreation. . . . [G]iven all other pertinent aspects of California law, Proposition 8 simply could 
not have the effect on procreation or childbearing that Proponents claim it might have been 
intended to have. Accordingly, an interest in responsible procreation and childbearing cannot 
provide a rational basis for the measure.”). 
 368.  Id. at *23–25. 
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referring to the specific context surrounding Prop 8,
369
 the panel also 
considered and rejected other common justifications for banning 
same-sex marriage, including: the historical argument of the ban’s 
tradition or historical pedigree;
370
 the moral argument of the ban’s 
reflection of societal disapproval;
371
 and the positive-right argument 
that government is under no affirmative duty to recognize 
marriage.
372
 
After considering and rejecting each potential justification, the 
panel inferred from Prop 8’s effect that the voters took away the 
designation of marriage because they disapproved of gays and 
lesbians “as a class.”
373
 Relying on Romer, the panel ruled that the 
Equal Protection Clause does not permit Prop 8’s disapproval of a 
class undertaken for its own sake.
374
 In short, the panel’s conclusion 
that Prop 8 reflects disapproval of a class mirrors this Article’s 
assertion that the same-sex marriage ban is essentially invidious. 
XII.  ON THE WANE, REGARDLESS OF  
THE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY 
Other federal and state courts in various contexts recently have 
considered and, for the most part, rejected the responsible-
procreation defense.
375
 Perhaps most interesting for constitutional 
jurisprudence is that the essence of the constitutional dispute remains 
the same whether the battle is waged between heightened judicial 
scrutiny (due to interference with a fundamental right or a suspect 
 
 369.  See, e.g., id. at *15, *27. 
 370.  Id. at *25–26. 
 371.  Id. at *27. 
 372.  Id. at *18 (“This does not mean that the Constitution is a ‘one-way ratchet,’ as 
Proponents suggest. It means only that the Equal Protection Clause requires the state to have a 
legitimate reason for withdrawing a right from one group but not others, whether or not it was 
required to confer that right or benefit in the first place. . . . In both Romer and Moreno, the 
constitutional violation that the Supreme Court identified was not the failure to confer a right or 
benefit in the first place; Congress was no more obligated to provide food stamps than Colorado 
was to enact antidiscrimination laws. Rather, what the Supreme Court forbade in each case was 
the targeted exclusion of a group of citizens from a right or benefit that they had enjoyed on equal 
terms with all other citizens. The constitutional injury that Romer and Moreno identified—and 
that serves as a basis of our decision to strike down Proposition 8—has little to do with the 
substance of the right or benefit from which a group is excluded, and much to do with the act of 
exclusion itself.”). 
 373.  Id. at *27. 
 374.  Id. 
 375.  See, e.g., Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1190–91 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388–89 (D. Mass. 2010). 
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class) and rational basis review, or whether it is waged within the 
rational basis review level. Within the rational basis review level, the 
question is whether courts will apply the most deferential form of 
rational basis review exemplified by Dandridge v. Williams
376
 or the 
more robust form of rational basis review “with bite” associated with 
the trilogy of United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
377
 
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,
378
 and Romer v. 
 
 376.  397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 377.  413 U.S. 528 (1973). In Moreno, the Supreme Court applied rational basis review to 
invalidate a food stamp amendment denying benefits to households of unrelated members in 
order to prevent “hippies” from receiving food stamps. Id. at 534. The Moreno Court established 
what is now a boilerplate equal protection principle: “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” 
Id. As to the government’s argument that it nonetheless had a conceivably legitimate interest in 
minimizing food stamp fraud, the Moreno Court rejected any reliance on the government’s 
“wholly unsubstantiated assumptions” about the greater danger of fraud in unrelated households. 
Id. at 535. The Court explained that, “in practical effect,” the food stamp ban did not rationally 
further fraud prevention because the law did not exclude those likely to commit fraud but instead 
excluded those who were too poor to change their living arrangement so as to retain eligibility. Id. 
at 537–38. The Court also noted that other provisions of the Food Stamp Act directly addressed 
fraud prevention, which “necessarily casts considerable doubt” that Congress intended the 
exclusion of unrelated household members to prevent these same abuses. Id. at 536–37. The 
majority rejected using unrelated household status as a proxy for fraud, id. at 537–38, over Justice 
Rehnquist’s direct objection that the Court was required to defer to Congress because preventing 
fraud “conceivably” could justify the denial of food stamps to unrelated households, some of 
which might have been formed to take advantage of the food stamp program. Id. at 547 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, the Moreno Court emphasized scant but specific evidence in the 
legislative record revealing that the food stamp ban was intended to discriminate against hippies 
and rejected the government’s assumption that household relatedness was a reasonable proxy for 
likeliness to commit fraud as “wholly without any rational basis.” Id. at 538 (majority opinion). 
 378.  473 U.S. 432 (1985). The Court in Cleburne applied only rational basis review, id. at 
442, but invalidated the city’s denial of a special use permit to a group home for individuals with 
developmental disabilities, id. at 450. The Court emphasized some specific evidence in the record 
that the city council had been concerned with “the negative attitude of the majority of property 
owners” and the fear that junior high students across the street might harass the group home’s 
occupants, both justifications the Court rejected, reasoning that if either of those was the city’s 
interest, the city violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 448–49. The Court specifically 
explained, “It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could 
not order city action violative of the Equal Protection Clause, and the City may not avoid the 
strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body 
politic.” Id. at 448 (citation omitted). As in the Moreno food stamps case, the Court then 
considered the government’s other more neutral justifications including the group home’s 
location, size, and density of occupancy, as well as neighborhood occupancy and congestion. Id. 
at 449–50. The Court reasoned that none of these other concerns rationally justified singling out 
the group home as compared to other multiple occupancy dwellings and therefore concluded that 
the city’s action appeared “to rest on an irrational prejudice” against developmentally disabled 
persons. Id. at 450. 
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Evans.
379
 One paradigmatic example of the battle within rational 
basis review occurred in Romer, where the majority applied what 
Justice O’Connor later described as a more searching form of 
rational basis review,
380
 while Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion 
in Romer insisted that the more deferential Dandridge standard was 
more appropriate.
381
 Two key points emerge here: first, courts apply 
the more robust version of rational basis review when the 
government’s means are so far removed from its purported ends that 
the courts suspect invidious discrimination;
382
 and second, regardless 
 
 379.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). The six-justice majority in Romer did not require specific evidence 
to deduce that Colorado voters had enacted Amendment 2 based on “animus” toward gays and 
lesbians. Id. at 632. As it did in Moreno and Cleburne, the Romer Court required Colorado to 
show that Amendment 2 exhibited some rational relationship to a legitimate interest independent 
of discrimination so as to ensure “that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of 
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.” Id. at 632–33. The state had attempted to justify 
the law as merely a denial of “special rights” to gays, which might have been an attempt to trade 
on a potential distinction between positive and negative rights, but the Court instead looked to the 
effects of the law and found that it imposed a “special disability” only upon homosexuals. Id. at 
631. The state also attempted to defend the law as protecting the freedom of association and 
liberties of persons who object to homosexuality, as well as preserving scarce anti-discrimination 
resources, but the Court rejected these as “impossible to credit” because they were “so far 
removed” from the actual breadth of the amendment. Id. at 635. By process of elimination, and 
without citing any empirical or specific evidence, the Court concluded that Colorado voters 
classified homosexuals in Amendment 2 “to make them unequal to everyone else,” which 
violated equal protection. Id. 
  The majority reached its conclusion over a vehement dissent. Justice Scalia took issue 
with the majority’s assertion of voter animosity and instead characterized Amendment 2 as “a 
modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the 
efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.” Id. at 
636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia further defended the Colorado voters as having enacted 
an “eminently reasonable” law. Id. at 644. He argued that exhibiting “animus” toward conduct 
was constitutionally permissible and that this type of animus—“moral disapproval of homosexual 
conduct”—was the only sort of animus exhibited in Amendment 2. Id. 
  Although Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion did not cite particular evidence of 
animosity in the record to refute Justice Scalia, it emphasized the attenuation between the facial 
classification of gays and the purported governmental interests to support its conclusion that 
Amendment 2 was based on animus against the class it targeted. Id. at 635 (majority opinion). 
 380.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When a law 
exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching 
form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 381.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 382.  Within the Ninth Circuit, two administrative rulings on personnel matters have 
concluded that discrimination based on sexual orientation could be unconstitutional and refused 
to allow the federal government to deny health benefits to the legal same-sex spouses of federal 
employees. In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 
2009). In the Golinski decision, the Ninth Circuit’s Chief Judge, Alex Kozinski, construed the 
Federal Employee Health Benefits Act broadly to allow coverage of a same-sex spouse of a Ninth 
Circuit staff attorney specifically because to construe it narrowly to deny such coverage would 
require resolution of whether the resulting discrimination would violate equal protection and due 
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of how the courts characterize the level of review, nearly all seem to 
agree that the government must prove that the fit between its means 
and its ends has some footing in social reality.
383
 
The emerging trend is for courts to apply, at the very least, the 
more robust Romer version of rational basis review. For example, in 
Gill v. Office of Personnel Management,
384
 a federal district court in 
Massachusetts insisted upon some modicum of factual support for 
the linkage between the government’s means and its ends and, 
finding none, rejected each purported justification of DOMA as so 
far removed from the sweeping status-based enactment as to reflect 
irrational prejudice.
385
 Notably, the federal district court in Gill 
specifically rejected the responsible-procreation argument because 
the federal government conceded that the argument bore no rational 
relationship to the operation of DOMA and because denying same-
sex marriage “does nothing to promote stability in heterosexual 
parenting.”
386
 
 
process. 587 F.3d at 903–04. Chief Judge Kozinski reasoned that, because moral disapproval is 
not a legitimate governmental end, and because the government may not punish an individual 
based on sexual orientation, id., determining the constitutionality of DOMA would require a 
“searching and careful” inquiry into “history and context,” which would be a “delicate and 
difficult task[,]” id. at 903 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)). To avoid this 
“constitutional thicket,” id. at 904, Chief Judge Kozinski construed the federal employment 
benefits statute to allow the equal treatment required by the Ninth Circuit’s equal employment 
opportunity program, which prohibited discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation, id. at 
902, 904. Chief Judge Kozinski issued a subsequent order in the same case directing the federal 
Office of Personnel Management to cease interfering with his order that Ms. Golinski’s same-sex 
spouse be enrolled for health benefits. In re Golinski, 587 F.3d at 958, 963. 
  In a similar ruling, Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt ordered relief to a deputy 
federal public defender who was denied enrollment of his legal same-sex spouse in the federal 
health benefit program. In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925. Similar to the trial judge in Perry, Judge 
Reinhardt reasoned that the federal government discriminated against Mr. Levenson in violation 
of the federal employment plan’s prohibitions of sex discrimination and sexual orientation 
discrimination, id. 929–30, and that “some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny” likely 
applied to his constitutional claims. Id. at 931. Nonetheless, Judge Reinhardt did not find it 
necessary to determine which form of heightened scrutiny to apply. Id. He concluded instead that 
applying DOMA to deny such benefits was unconstitutional because “there is no rational basis for 
denying benefits to the same-sex spouses of [Federal Public Defender] employees while granting 
them to the opposite-sex spouses of FPD employees. . . .” Id. 
 383.  One outlier from this pattern is a recent decision by an intermediate appellate panel in 
Texas, which followed Justice Scalia’s dissent rather than the Romer majority, invoking the 
deferential Dandridge standard as establishing all that was required for the state to justify 
restricting marriage and divorce to opposite-sex couples and squarely rejecting the reasoning of 
Perry. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659, 676–77 (Tex. App. 2010) (denying a 
divorce to a same-sex couple who legally married in Massachusetts and then moved to Texas). 
 384.  699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 385.  Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388–97 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 386.  Id. at 388–89. The court explained: 
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In a more narrowly focused employment benefits case, 
Dragovich v. United States Department of Treasury,
387
 three 
California state employees and their lawful same-sex spouses filed 
suit against the U.S. Department of the Treasury and various federal 
officials challenging the constitutionality of DOMA’s infringement 
on their ability to participate in the state’s long-term care insurance 
program.
388
 In ruling that the plaintiffs stated sufficient equal 
protection and due process claims, the federal district court 
acknowledged that the federal defendants disavowed the responsible-
procreation defense but nonetheless noted that “DOMA’s definition 
of marriage does not bear a relationship to encouraging procreation, 
because marriage has never been contingent on having children” and 
because excluding same-sex couples from the federal definition of 
marriage “does not encourage heterosexual marriages.”
389
 
In a more recent and sweeping rejection of the justifications 
proffered for DOMA, a federal district court judge ruled that the 
federal government violated a federal employee’s right to equal 
protection under the Fifth Amendment when it refused to enroll the 
employee’s lawful same-sex spouse in a federal health-benefits 
 
  This court can readily dispose of the notion that denying federal recognition to 
same-sex marriages might encourage responsible procreation, because the government 
concedes that this objective bears no rational relationship to the operation of DOMA. 
Since the enactment of DOMA, a consensus has developed among the medical, 
psychological, and social welfare communities that children raised by gay and lesbian 
parents are just as likely to be well-adjusted as those raised by heterosexual parents. 
But even if Congress believed at the time of DOMA’s passage that children had the 
best chance at success if raised jointly by their biological mothers and fathers, a desire 
to encourage heterosexual couples to procreate and rear their own children more 
responsibly would not provide a rational basis for denying federal recognition to same-
sex marriages. Such denial does nothing to promote stability in heterosexual parenting. 
Rather, it “prevent[s] children of same-sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable 
advantages that flow from the assurance of a stable family structure,” when afforded 
equal recognition under federal law. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 964 (Mass. 
2003)). 
 387.  764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 388.  Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1179–80 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 389.  Id. at 1190–92 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J. 
dissenting) (“[W]hat justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to 
homosexual couples . . . ? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the 
elderly are allowed to marry.”); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 972 (N.D. Cal. 
2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 7, 2012)). 
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plan.
390
 Ninth Circuit staff attorney Karen Golinski married her 
same-sex spouse in the summer of 2008 during the window when 
California law recognized same-sex marriages.
391
 After the federal 
Office of Personnel Management relied on DOMA as its basis for 
repeatedly refusing to enroll Golinski’s spouse in her health-benefits 
plan, Golinski filed a constitutional challenge.
392
 Noting that the 
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have yet to determine whether 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is suspect or quasi-
suspect,
393
 the district court conducted the standard suspect-class 
analysis. The district court found that gays and lesbians as a class 
have suffered a history of discrimination, that the class is relatively 
politically powerless against majority prejudices, that the trait 
defining the class is irrelevant to an individual’s ability to contribute 
to society, and that the trait is a defining or immutable 
characteristic.
394
 Accordingly, the district court applied “heightened 
scrutiny”
395
 and found that none of the proffered justifications 
satisfied the standard.
396
 
Most relevant here, the district court found that those defending 
DOMA had provided no credible evidence to genuinely dispute that 
same-sex married couples function as responsible parents,
397
 that 
denying federal recognition and benefits of same-sex marriage “does 
nothing to support opposite-sex parenting,”
398
 that denying federal 
recognition does not alter parental rights under state law, and that 
denying federal recognition of same-sex marriage “does nothing to 
 
 390.  Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-00257, 2012 WL 569685, at *27 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 22, 2012). 
 391.  Id. at *1. 
 392.  Golinski previously obtained several administrative orders from Ninth Circuit Chief 
Judge Alex Kozinski ordering the Office of Personnel Management to enroll Golinski’s spouse in 
the health benefits plan; the Office of Personnel Management declined to either follow or appeal 
these administrator orders, but the federal district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to issue 
mandamus relief based on such administrative orders. Id. at *1–3; see also infra note 382 
(discussing two administrative rulings of the Ninth Circuit). 
 393. Golinski, 2012 WL 569685, at *11. 
 394.  Id. at *11–14. 
 395.  Rather than applying the typical strict scrutiny standard (requiring that the classification 
be necessary to achieve a compelling government interest), the court used the standard associated 
with intermediate scrutiny (requiring that the classification be “substantially related to an 
important governmental objective”). Id. at *15 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
535–36 (1996)). 
 396.  Id. at *20. 
 397.  Id. at *17. 
 398.  Id. 
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encourage or discourage opposite-sex couples from having children 
within marriage.”
399
 The district court then ruled, in the alternative, 
that DOMA failed even rational basis review, reiterating its findings 
that DOMA has no effect on who may become a parent under federal 
or state law, or on any couple’s ability to procreate, or on procreation 
and child-rearing practices.
400
 The district court therefore found that 
“Congress’ stated justification of encouraging responsible 
procreation and child-rearing bears no rational relationship to the 
classification which burdens same-sex married couples.”
401
 Again, 
this court, like others, concluded its decision with a focus on the 
invidious nature of the ban. The district court was persuaded that, 
even if the animus present in the legislative history did not motivate 
DOMA’s passage, it may have been motivated by prejudice that may 
result “from insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational 
reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against 
people who appear to be different in some respects from 
ourselves.”
402
 
In another federal case, Collins v. Brewer,
403
 involving state 
health benefits, a federal district court judge in Arizona issued a 
preliminary injunction against the state’s stripping of health benefits 
from the domestic partners and children of state employees because 
the action was not rationally related to any legitimate state interest.
404
 
The court specifically found that denying benefits to same-sex 
domestic partners cannot promote marriage because those couples 
are ineligible to marry and that the denial of health benefits bears no 
relationship whatsoever to encouraging marriage of opposite-sex 
couples, who already enjoy the right to marry.
405
 Given the lack of 
relationship between denying same-sex marriage and promoting 
heterosexual marriage, the district court noted that the responsible-
procreation defense might have been merely a post hoc justification 
 
 399.  Id. at *18. 
 400.  Id. at *22–23. 
 401.  Id. at *23. The district court also rejected the purported justifications of nurturing 
traditional marriage, defending traditional morality, preserving scarce government resources, 
maintaining the status quo, proceeding with caution, and avoiding inconsistency. Id. at *18–20, 
*23–26. 
 402.  Id. at *26 (quoting Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2001) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 403.  727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 404.  Id. at 807. 
 405.  Id. 
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for litigation purposes.
406
 Throughout its analysis, the district court 
emphasized that most of the state’s defenses amounted to invidious 
discrimination: rejecting advancing cost saving based on an 
“invidious distinction,” rejecting advancing administrative efficiency 
based on an “impermissible invidious classification,” rejecting 
selectively subsidizing heterosexual spouses as discriminatory 
animosity, and rejecting promoting marriage and procreation as not 
rationally related to the ban on health benefits.
407
 
Similarly, within the family law context, both a state trial court 
and a state appellate court in Florida recently invalidated that state’s 
ban on adoption by gays and lesbians because they found “no 
rational basis for the statute.”
408
 In this matter of the adoption of 
X.X.G., there was no specific as-applied factual dispute because all 
parties agreed that the petitioning foster parent was a fit parent and 
that his adoption of the foster children was in their best interest.
409
 
Moreover, all parties agreed to apply the state’s rational basis test, 
which generally tracks the federal standard in requiring that the 
state’s classification bear a rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental objective.
410
 Florida’s courts have interpreted this 
rational basis standard to require the classification to be “based on a 
real difference which is reasonably related to the subject and purpose 
of the regulation.”
411
 
As in the Prop 8 litigation, there was some dispute in the Florida 
adoption case about whether a trial was appropriate. The state 
opposed having a trial and producing findings about social-science 
evidence.
412
 However, both the trial court and appellate court 
disagreed,
413
 relying in part on a prior Florida Supreme Court ruling 
that a sufficient factual record would be needed to determine whether 
the adoption ban satisfied the rational basis standard for equal 
 
 406.  Id. 
 407.  Id. at 804–07. The district court conceded that cost control, administrative efficiency, 
and the promotion of marriage are “legitimate” state interests but concluded that the absolute 
denial of benefits to employees with same-sex partners is not rationally related to these interests. 
Id. at 807. 
 408.  Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 81, 91 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 409.  Id. at 82. 
 410.  Id. at 83. 
 411.  Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 412.  Id. at 87. 
 413.  Id. 
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protection under the state constitution.
414
 Therefore, the state court in 
X.X.G. held a four-day trial at which the foster parent and the state 
each presented expert witnesses about the relative parenting 
capabilities of homosexuals and heterosexuals, resulting in the trial 
court’s fifty-three-page ruling invalidating the ban.
415
 
The merits of the arguments used to defend the adoption ban are 
quite similar to those used to defend the marriage ban. Florida 
officials did not claim that gay people are unfit parents and even 
conceded, “[G]ay people and heterosexuals make equally good 
parents.”
416
 The state argued instead that the rational basis for 
prohibiting homosexual adoption is that “children will have better 
role models, and face less discrimination, if they are placed in non-
homosexual households, preferably with a husband and wife as the 
parents.”
417
 In rejecting this defense, the appellate court simply 
noted, “that is not what the statute does.”
418
 Moreover, after hearing 
the petitioner’s ten expert witnesses and the state’s two expert 
witnesses, the trial court found that “robust” research supported the 
scholarly consensus that “there are no differences in the parenting of 
homosexuals or the adjustment of their children” and that this 
consensus “is so far beyond dispute that it would be irrational to hold 
otherwise.”
419
 As to the risk of discrimination and stigma that 
children might face if they were placed with gay parents, the 
appellate court ruled that this factor did not provide a reasonable 
basis for Florida’s contradictory policy of allowing gays to serve as 
foster parents and guardians but prohibiting them from serving as 
adoptive parents.
420
 Because the state’s experts’ opinions were not 
shown to be scientifically valid, the appellate court also rejected the 
 
 414.  Id. at 83–84, 87 (citing Cox v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 
903 (Fla. 1995) (remanding a prior equal protection challenge to the state’s ban on adoption by 
gay persons for “a factual completion of the record as to this single constitutional issue and a 
decision as to this issue based upon the completed record”)). In Cox, the petitioner abandoned the 
case, so no trial was held. Id. at 84. 
 415.  Id. at 82–83. 
 416.  Id. at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 417.  Id. 
 418.  Id. 
 419.  Id. at 86–87 (emphasis omitted). 
 420.  Id. at 91. 
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state’s argument that their experts’ alternative view of the scientific 
data could provide a sufficient rational basis.
421
 
In another specific example of the effect of DOMA, a legally 
married same-sex couple has challenged the constitutionality of 
DOMA’s interference with their ability to file a joint bankruptcy 
petition.
422
 The federal bankruptcy court’s recent ruling in 
In re Balas
423
 rejected the responsible-procreation defense and the 
other interests asserted by Congress in DOMA as not standing up to 
“any level of scrutiny.”
424
 More specifically, the bankruptcy court 
reasoned, “[T]he joint petition of the Debtors will have no effect on 
procreation or child-bearing. It would not appear to be fair or rational 
for the court to conclude that allowing the Debtors to file a joint 
bankruptcy petition will in any way harm any marriage of 
heterosexual persons.”
425
 Like the courts in Perry, Gill, Dragovich, 
Golinski, Collins, and X.X.G., the bankruptcy court in Balas 
concluded that the same-sex-marriage ban is, in the final analysis, an 
enactment of a moral view that is neither supported by evidence nor 
consistent with the Constitution.
426
 
XIII.  CONCLUSION 
This genealogy of the responsible-procreation defense has traced 
its religious roots; its linkage to a tarnished legacy of stereotypes 
based on race, gender, and class; its attenuated linkage to 
contemporary societal and legal norms; its utter lack of demonstrated 
evidentiary support, after full trials at both the state and federal 
levels; and its rise and fall among court decisions, depending 
primarily upon whether courts unquestionably accepted its 
presuppositions or subjected them to meaningful review. 
 
 421.  Id. at 89–90. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the testimony of Walter 
Schumm from Kansas State University did “not support the blanket prohibition on homosexual 
adoption” and also acquiesced to the trial court’s acceptance of other experts’ testimony that 
Dr. Schumm’s research “contained fundamental statistical errors.” Id. at 88. Similarly, other 
experts testified to errors in scientific methodology and reporting by George Rekers from the 
University of South Carolina, and the appellate court acquiesced to the trial court’s finding that 
his testimony was “far from a neutral and unbiased recitation of the relevant scientific evidence.” 
Id. at 89–90 (internal quotations omitted). 
 422.  In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 569 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 423.  449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 424.  Id. at 578. 
 425.  Id. 
 426.  See id. at 578–79. 
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In the final analysis, the responsible-procreation defense appears 
to be not only ideological but also invidious, and on the wane. It has 
failed to withstand even the most deferential standard of rational 
review. As the Supreme Court explained in Romer, “even in the 
ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of 
standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the 
classification adopted and the object to be attained” because “[b]y 
requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to an 
independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that 
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the 
group burdened by the law.”
427
 After ample opportunity, opponents 
of same-sex marriage have failed to demonstrate that the responsible-
procreation defense finds “some footing in the realities of the 
subject.”
428
 As a result, the emerging trend is that both executive 
officials and courts are rejecting the defense and concluding that the 
same-sex-marriage ban is drawn, not to further a proper legislative 
end but to make same-sex couples and their children unequal to 
everyone else.
429
 Even conservative commentators defending the 
same-sex-marriage ban openly concede that it is drawn to 
disadvantage same-sex couples and to favor opposite-sex couples.
430
 
Regardless of which level of scrutiny is applied, contemporary 
constitutional jurisprudence is quite clear that such an invidious 
ideology is not a legitimate basis for law: “Private biases may be 
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or 
indirectly, give them effect.”
431
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 427.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996). 
 428.  Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993). 
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